




Old Well and South Building, ca. 1943 (North Carolina Collection, University of North Carolina Library at Chapel Hill).

Winter "Gothic" Wonderland, 1958 (Duke University Archives. Durham, North Carolina, USA).

Alumni Building, North Carolina State University, 1958 (Special Collections Research Center, North Carolina State University Libraries-0000002).



The Triangle Institute for Security Studies

Welcomes you to its

Eleventh Annual Honor Student Dinner

featuring

Presentations of Honor Theses by Undergraduates in Security Studies

Friday Center, Willow room

Chapel Hill, North Carolina

April 15th, 2015

5:30—8:30 pm

Cosponsored by Duke University's Program in
American Grand Strategy

MENU

Assorted Dinner Rolls / Butter /
Iced Water / Iced Tea / Coffee

Seasonal Garden Salad with Balsamic
Vinaigrette

Chicken Cacciatore
Ravioli with Sun Dried Tomato Cream
Sauce

Marinated Roasted Red Potatoes
Pan Roasted Vegetables with
Herb Vinaigrette

Dutch Apple Pie
Mini Brownie and Cappuccino Mousse
Parfaits

SCHEDULE

5:30 PM Buffet Opens

5:45 PM Welcome

5:50 PM Tegan George,
UNC-Chapel Hill

6:20 Brandon Libro,
North Carolina State University

6:50 *Break*

7:00 Julia Janco,
Duke University

7:30 Emily Werk,
UNC-Chapel Hill

8:00 Ted Leonhardt,
Duke University

8:30 Farewell

TEGAN GEORGE

UNC-Chapel Hill

Tegan George, a native of Miami, Florida, is a senior at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill studying Peace, War, and Defense and Global Studies. Within these majors, she has mainly focused on international security, with regional studies in the Middle East, North Africa, and Latin America. Her research interests include state sponsorship of terrorism, counterinsurgency doctrine, and the future of conflict resolution in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the summer of 2014, she conducted original research on rebel group alliance formation as a fellow with the Moore Undergraduate Research Program. She has also interned with RTI International in Research Triangle Park and the Italian Academy Foundation in Rome, participating in a variety of international development and global governance projects. Upon completion of her bachelor's degree in May 2015, Tegan will pursue doctoral studies in international relations at the University of Washington at Seattle, potentially investigating whether popular support of terrorism can replace a state sponsor as a reliable enforcement mechanism for rebel groups.

Advisor: Navin Bapat, Political Science,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Development and Management of the Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Program: The Discord Between Civil Authority and the Military

The Pakistani nuclear weapons program represents decades of sacrifice, sanctions and scientific development. It embodies the resolve of the nation to produce one of the most complicated and dangerous technologies of the past century: an atomic bomb. This thesis analyzes the balance of power between civilian leaders and the military in the context of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. This competing relationship began with the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947. While a civilian leader initiated the nuclear program, his term (1971-1977) was the only period in Pakistani history when a civilian leader possessed autonomous control over the program. In the years that followed there were two sides in the struggle to control the emergent nuclear program. On the one hand, the Pakistani military believed that the nation's chaotic political system was too unreliable to manage the nuclear arsenal. On the other hand, civilians believed that the military intervened too frequently into national policy making. After examining this conflict, it becomes clear that the military's incursion into politics was largely due to the failure of the civilian political leadership. This was in contrast with the fact that the armed forces were the most experienced and technologically capable institution to control the Pakistani arsenal. Indeed, this evaluation of comparative Pakistani military today has a major, if not exclusive role in the command and control of Pakistani nuclear forces.

EMILY WERK
UNC-Chapel Hill

Emily Werk is a senior at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. She is studying Peace, War and Defense with a concentration in International and National Defense and Security. She has a second major in Hispanic Literature and Culture and a minor in Biology. In addition to her education at UNC-CH, she spent six months at the University of Seville where she studied the Spanish defense industry and the country's national security policies. During the summer of 2014, Emily interned in Washington, D.C. with the International Institute for Strategic Studies. She is also a Wickersham Scholar with the Triangle Institute for Security Studies. Her research interests include the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, particularly in South Asia. She received the Gillian T. Cell Honors Thesis Research Award and a grant from the Peace, War and Defense Department to conduct research on the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. After graduation in the spring of 2015, Emily plans to move to Washington, D.C. and pursue a career in nuclear policy.

Advisor: Joe Caddell, History Department,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

**The Micro-Foundations of Inter-Group
Rebel Construction**

Intuitively, rebel groups should ally, as this allows them to maximize their power and fighting efficiency against their target. Yet, groups do not always form alliances, and instead sometimes engage in inter-factional conflict. This raises the question: when and why does cooperation fail to materialize between rebel groups? Using micro-level studies of terrorism, I argue that the strength of groups is typically a function of resources or commodities (such as oil) and their ability to attract state sponsorship. I demonstrate that the access rebel groups have to these two factors—state sponsorship and access to natural resources—ultimately determines the success or failure of rebel alliances. I hypothesize that both access to lootable natural resources and access to state sponsorship leads to increased inter-group alliance, but state sponsorship is a much more powerful indicator of alliance than resources are. I test these hypotheses using a set of Middle Eastern conflicts as case studies, along with preliminary quantitative analysis, which is significant at the 0.013 level.

JULIA JANCO
Duke University

Julia Janco is a double major in Political Science at Duke University, with a concentration in International Relations, and French. She conducted an honors thesis in Political Science on the impact of extremist education in promoting an environment more prone to terrorism in Pakistan. Julia is a firm advocate for educational opportunities and lowering the achievement gap: she tutors in the Durham public schools and has initiated a peer-mentoring program in local high schools, which has now spread to 4 cities worldwide. She is a recipient of the Karsh Family Scholarship, presented to students demonstrating high academic merit and a commitment to community service, is a selected op-ed columnist for *The Chronicle*, and has been named to the Dean's List. She studied abroad in Paris at Paris Diderot University last year and was a selected participant in two DukeEngage immersion programs in Cairo, Egypt – working at an NGO for street children and teaching English, and Rabat, Morocco – working for a human rights NGO conducting research on the death penalty. Her travels abroad – as well as her Arabic study – prompted her interest in international relations and security studies. Her plans for after graduation are still pending.

Advisor: David Siegel, Political Science,
Duke University

**Before the Blowback: American Policy in
the Lead-up to Operation Ajax**

In August 1953, the American CIA and British SIS collaborated with the Shah of Iran and elements of the Iranian military to overthrow the government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in Operation Ajax. The coup marked the culmination of an ongoing crisis that had begun when Mossadegh nationalized the holdings of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951. Simultaneously, the United States feared a takeover of the Iranian government by the communist, Soviet-backed Tudeh Party. After two years of diplomacy and covert propaganda by the Truman administration, President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved the CIA's plans for Operation Ajax mere months after taking office.

Operation Ajax has become one of the controversial episodes of the early Cold War on account of what many see as its role in creating the "blowback" of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. However, historians cannot properly engage in the "blowback" debate without understanding why the United States adopted such a bold policy. Past authors have alternately pinned responsibility for the shift in American policy on differences between presidential administrations, "structural" factors like the Cold War balance of power and Middle Eastern politics, British imperialism, and the influence of the international oil companies. This thesis interrogates those explanations for the decision to approve Operation Ajax and analyzes their strengths and shortcomings. In doing so, I engage theories of American policy in the larger Cold War, entering discussions of American policy in the third world, alliance politics, and other topics. Finally, my thesis questions the limits that scholars impose between those different theories and advocates a multilayered approach to Cold War history.

While evaluating competing explanations, I hope to update the narrative for the decision to undertake Operation Ajax to account for source materials that have become available. In addition to utilizing the State Department's Foreign Relations of the United States series, the memoirs of major figures in the crisis, and other widely available sources, I accessed the CIA's CREST declassified collection in College Park, Maryland, the British Foreign Office records in the United Kingdom's National Archive at Kew, and the BP Company Archives at the University of Warwick. Most of the CREST documents were not available when scholarship on Operation Ajax first took off in the 1980s and 1990s, and researchers have not always utilized the BP Archive. These additional sources promote the clarification of the American policy trajectory from 1951 to 1953 as a prerequisite for further debate on Operation Ajax.

TED LEONHARDT
Duke University

Ted Leonhardt is a senior at Duke University completing a double major in History and Political Science. During his sophomore year, his paper titled “Finding a Role: The Decision to Fight in the Falklands and the Redefinition of British Imperialism” won the Lowell Aptman Prize for best historical essay by a first or second year student. He joined the student council of Duke’s American Grand Strategy Program in his sophomore year and served as Treasurer for the Alexander Hamilton Society, a student-run group that organizes foreign policy events. A paper he co-authored in the American Grand Strategy seminar course last fall titled “Should We Stay or Should We Go? The Shale Revolution and American Involvement in the Middle East” is awaiting publication in the Columbia undergraduate *Journal of Politics and Society* in fall 2015. He also serves as Vice President of Dukes and Duchesses, the student liaison organization for the university president’s office, and as a Co-Chair of the Senior Gift Committee. With a fellow student, he authored a book profiling notable Groton graduates, *Divine Fire: Groton School and the American Century* and delivered a talk on the subject on the anniversary of Groton’s founding in September 2012. After graduation, he will be working in mergers and acquisitions investment banking at Bank of America Merrill Lynch in New York City. Thereafter, he plans to attend law school or pursue a graduate degree in history or international relations.

Advisor: Hal Brands, History and Public Policy,
Duke University

**Madrasas in Pakistan:
Producing An Environment Prone to Terrorist
Activity**

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, much attention has been focused on Pakistan’s religious schools, known as madrasas, many of which believed to be backed by terrorist groups and harboring extremist ideals. This paper uses Global Terrorism Database (GTD) data on domestic terrorist attacks and student madrasa enrollment rates from across the country to test the hypothesis that the mere presence of madrasas in society – and the radical mindset for extremism that many of them impart on their students – promotes an environment more prone to terrorist activity. However, the negative binomial regression finds no correlation between madrasa education and terrorist activity. A number of possible explanations for these results are analyzed, including the possibility of no correlation, the influence of the tribal region along the Afghanistan border, the lawlessness and unregulation of the madrasa system, and overall crime rates in Pakistan. The analysis challenges conventional wisdom and stereotypes publicized by policy makers following September 11th on the impact of extremist education on terrorism.

BRANDON LIBRO

Brandon Libro is a senior at North Carolina State University majoring in History, with a Concentration in Teacher Education and minoring in political science and Spanish. His interest lies in the intersection between history and political science, and his focus is on foreign policy. He has achieved dean's list for five of his seven semesters at NC State and has been enrolled in the honors program for three semesters. He received support from the History Department to travel to the Carter Library in Atlanta, Georgia. Brandon plans for a career in teaching. Between May-June 2013, he studied abroad in Cusco and Lima Perú where, besides taking coursework in Peruvian culture, he educated children at an elementary school in Urumbambas. After graduation, he will study teaching methodology at the University of North Carolina. Thereafter he plans to join the AmeriCorps and serve for two years with Teach for America.

Advisor: Nancy Mitchell, History,
North Carolina State University

The Great Play: The Carter Administration's Response to the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan from December 24, 1979 to January 4, 1980

"This is the most serious international development that has occurred since I have been President," wrote U.S. President Jimmy Carter in January 1980, referring to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. This study examines the response of Carter and his administration to this crisis during the first week following the invasion. My analysis rests on an examination of both secondary sources – specifically memoirs of participants – and archival research, most particularly in the Carter Library. To date, impressions of Carter's policies have been obscured by the large number of documents that remain classified or heavily redacted. This is true of records of high level meetings of the Special Coordinating Committee, The Policy Review Council, and the National Security Council, for example, as well as many State Department records from 1978 onwards. State Department documents that were sent to the White House, however, are at the Carter Library, and some of these have been declassified. These sources were supplemented by many others, including Vance's Evening Reports and Brzezinski's Weekly Reports and memoranda, as well as early drafts of speeches delivered by President Carter. Responding to the Soviet invasion were three key players: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and President Jimmy Carter. Conventional wisdom tends to see Carter as the man in the middle, swayed by perspectives from the right (Brzezinski) and the left (Vance) – the former more anti-Soviet and less liberal than the other. The image of a trident comes to mind. A study of the declassified documents makes it clear that the administrations' reaction to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan was, in fact, much more nuanced than is widely recognized.