Casualties Conference Summaries

<u>**Panel I: Targeting Civilians in Warfare**</u>
Benjamin Valentino and Paul Huth:
Valentino and Huth looked at whether there was a link between the causes of specific wars and the likelihood that one or both belligerents target civilians. They argue that much of the focus of international relations research has focused on the causes of war rather than the effects. The exclusive focus on cause has at times led scholars to forget that one of the primary reasons we study wars is because their effects are so devastating. The scant amount of scholarly attention to what happens during wars means that there is not much data available. In order to remedy this and look at one of the most horrific effects of war, they collected data on civilian casualties to see under what conditions states choose to kill large numbers of civilians.

They argue that past theorizing has focused on three types of hypotheses. First, some have argued that civilian casualties are collateral damage. The are an inevitable fact of war and targeting civilians is distributed randomly across wars. If this is the case, the only thing we can hope to do is to stop wars altogether.

Other work has focused on the internal attributes of the states, often disaggregating states into good and bad states. This literature has focused on regime type, arguing that democratic states are less likely to target civilians; on states that sign international treaties, arguing that those who respect international law are less likely to target civilians; and on states that have chauvinistic or racist histories, arguing that those states are more likely to target civilians.

Finally, Valentino and Huth have focused on how the specific characteristics of a given war influence a state's decision to target civilians. There is a logic behind civilian victimization. By targeting civilians, a state destroys the productive potential of its enemy. In addition, targeting civilians may cause civilians to sue their government for an end to the war. However, there are drawbacks to targeting civilians. It diverts resources from the battlefield. It could also provoke retaliation, putting one's own civilians at risk. Valentino and Huth argue that these risks will only be undertaken in highly costly wars.

Specifically, civilian victimization is likely in wars of attrition and counter insurgency. Both of these strategies usually involve high costs and in both strategies civilians are critical to the war effort because they provide most of the resources to fight the wars. Targeting civilians should be more likely when war aims are more expansive. Specifically, we should see states using this tactic when they are pursuing territorial conquest or regime change. Finally, we should states targeting civilians in longer wars as the costs of the war increases.

They provide statistical evidence to support their hypotheses. First they looked at all wars from 1942 to 2000 and tried to predict what would cause states to undergo strategies of mass killing, which they define as 50,000 or more civilian casualties. They found 30 cases of mass killing. There was a significant relationship between guerrilla warfare are mass killing. They further disaggregated the data and looked at the strength of the insurgency and the extent of civilian support for the insurgency. They found that as the strength of the insurgents went from low to high the probability of mass killing increased from 4% to 25%. When the insurgent strength was high and there were high levels of civilian support, the probability of mass killing jumps to 70%.

Because most of their cases in this data set were civil wars, the recently began investigating the cause of civilian casualties in interstate wars. They looked at all interstate wars from 1900 to 2003. Instead of looking at mass killing, the used the total number of civilians killed as the dependent variable. They found that attrition strategies and counterinsurgency strategies were significantly related to an increased number of civilian deaths. They noted that there were many more interstate wars that employed attrition strategies than counterinsurgencies. They also found that the relationship between the number of civilian casualties and war goals that included regime change and territorial annexation were significant. Finally, they found that war duration was positively related to the number of civilian casualties. There was a 6 fold increase in the predicted number of civilian deaths for attrition wars. There was an 18 to 19 fold increase if the war involved expansive war aims. If a state had all three factors—they were in an attrition war, had expansive war aims, and the war was long—their model predicts 6000 civilians killed compared to 2 when none of the three factors was present.

Stathis Kalyvas:

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Kalyvas argues that when studying civilian victimization, it is important to distinguish between interstate in civil war. Not only is the type of warfare different but civil wars are plagued by problems of divided sovereignty and unclear frontlines. In addition, in civil wars identification of belligerents is difficult and the problem of defection is more salient. This suggests that there are strong theoretical reasons for distinguishing between the targeting of civilians in interstate and civil wars.

As the previous panelists noted, there have been a number of theories put forth to explain civilian targeting. However, we have not looked at criminology. Kalyvas notes that in the study of criminals, no unified theory explaining homicide is put forth. Its not clear that we should expected a unified theory to account for targeting civilians either.

There are many sources of variation in violence across wars: the resources of actors, the ideology of the actors, the military culture of the actors, the extent to which prevailing international norms matter, the public coverage and exposure of the actors, etc. Even within civil wars, the goals of the belligerents vary considerably. They range from intimidation to demoralization, from enforcing control to disrupting control, from radicalizing the public to boosting the moral of the public, from provoking countermeasures and repression to looting. At times these goals are mutually contradictory. Depending on which goal is more important, civilian victimization may or may not benefit a given actor.

Kalyvas argues that when studying civilian victimization in civil wars there are a number of problems. First, he argues that observational equivalence complicates analysis. He notes that a rise in rebel attacks against civilians is consistent with two contradictory interpretations: the rebels are getting stronger and their attacks are instruments of expanding their influence or the rebels are getting weaker and their attacks are aimed at defending their influence. Likewise, a lack of violence could signal that a group has either total control over the area or no control over the area. Thus, we should see violence when territorial control is shifting. Being able to distinguish these scenarios requires fine-grained information for interpreting event data.

An endogeneity problem also plagues the analysis. The identity and preferences of civilians often prompt them to be targeted but at the same time those identities and preferences are shaped by the actions of the different belligerents. If civilians are beginning to defect to the other side and then they are targeted, this may prompt them to continue defection. It is unclear whether they are being targeting because they are defecting or whether they are defecting because they are being targeted. Preferences evolve over the course of the war. Violence might change people's preferences. We cannot just look at support and assume its fixed and constant throughout the war.

The final problem with studying civilian targeting is measurement. There is selection bias in media reports. Often, there is an inverse relation between newspaper reports and actual patterns of violence. When violence is widespread, it is not reported but if violence is rare, sporadic events tend to be covered. In addition, many sources do not distinguish between the types of violence. In civil wars, much of the violence is selective and this tends to be undercounted in media, while indiscriminate violence gets much more coverage.

Keeping, these limitations in mind, Kalyvas reported the findings of his most recent book, *The Logic and Violence in Civil Wars*, were he uses first hand accounts of civilian victimization to study the logic of civilian targeting. He disaggregates violence against civilians into indiscriminate and selective violence. He finds that there is an inverse relationship between information and indiscriminate violence, which often means that this type of violence occurs far away from control "hubs." With selective violence, the logic is to deter defection. Employing this strategy depends on accurate targeting and thus is very sensitive to information asymmetries. Selective violence is likely when political actors exercise dominant but incomplete control; not when they exercise total control or under parity with their opponent. This separates civil war from interstate war, where targeting civilians occurs when the opposing sides are equal and where most of the killing occurs on the frontline. He also notes that when opposing groups are employing selective violence information often comes from other civilians so it is not just that the military is targeting civilians because in some cases civilians are targeting other civilians to settle personal scores.

Kalyvas finds that the pattern of selective and indiscriminate violence is almost reversed. Most indiscriminate violence is perpetrated by the government and only a few villages are targeted. Most of the violence is localized and many villages escape this type of violence.   With regard to selective violence, insurgents are slightly more likely to use this type of method and violence is more evenly spread throughout the population. There is more selective violence than indiscriminate violence and insurgents are more likely to kill civilians than the government.

After presenting evidence for these conclusions, Kalyvas notes that his findings would have been very different had he relied on second hand information or "off the shelf" data. He would have undercounted selective violence, undercounted rebel violence, been unable to distinguish between indiscriminate and selective violence, and been unable to disaggregate by temporal period.

Alexander Downes:

Downes' research focuses on why states select military strategies that intentionally target civilians or cause large numbers of noncombatant fatalities. The choice of these strategies is strange given the fact that it is morally repugnant and normally does not make sense strategically.

Downes reviews a number of theories that attempt to explain this phenomena. Some scholars have focused on regime type- although there is not consensus about how this variable operates. Some argue that democratic norms act as a restraint, while others argue that democracies may be more likely to target civilians because the public could demand these strategies and also because democratic publics are generally unforgiving when it comes to loosing wars. The second perspective focuses on identity. When you think the other side is barbaric or uncivilized you think that you have to be uncivilized to and so you target civilians. Two opposing hypotheses arise from organizational theory, with one arguing that compatibility with military culture determines whether states will choose to target civilians, and the other arguing that militaries will target civilians when they think it will advance their organizational interests.

Downes argues that states are more likely to target civilians when they are desperate to win or to save lives on their side. We often see this type of desperation in wars of attrition. States are also likely to target civilians when they are trying to annex territory because it helps eliminate resistance to their rule.

States want to win quick and decisive victory. They usually do this by targeting the military because that is the quickest and easiest way to ensure victory. Attacking civilians often takes more time. They tend not to target civilians right away. When those counterforce strategies fail—the war bogs down and becomes long and costly and brutal-- states revisit the issue and are more likely to employ any strategy they think will help them win. Targeting civilians can weaken enemy moral or undermine the other side's ability to fight and thereby help that state win. This may also explain the failure of punishment strategies because they get implemented in the hardest cases.

The annexation side of the argument is that when states want to annex territory, citizens of the enemy state arguably pose an both immediate threat—you get military subversion during the war—and a longer term threat—potential for rebellion down the road and possible action by enemy state to retake the territory. Here we see states targeting civilians early on.

Downes tests this theory using statistical models. He runs his analysis using four different dependent variables: whether the state targeted civilians, whether mass killing occurred, the total number of civilians killed, and categorical measure of the number of civilians killed. His independent variables include a regime type variable. He operationalizes the barbaric identity hypothesis by controlling for religious differences between the two countries. He uses war duration, battle deaths, and whether the war was a war of attrition to measure desperation. He also includes a dummy variable to capture whether one of the goals the state was pursuing was annexation of territory. His data looks at wars between 1816 and 2000. The data set includes 323 countries and 100 interstate wars.

Downes finds that civilian victimization is more likely in wars of attrition, such as the world wars, and when countries are trying to annex territory. Differences in religion were not important. Democracies and autocracies are equally likely to kill civilians. In wars of attrition, democracies are actually more likely to target civilians or kill more

civilians than autocracies. In fact, most civilian vicitimization by democracies occurs in wars of attrition. Of the 15 cases of democratic civilian victimization, 13 occurred in wars of attrition and 2 occurred in annexation.

Downes also provides evidence against the organizational culture hypothesis. He cites Britain in WWI discarding battleship culture for starvation blockade and the Luftwaffe abandoning the culture of close air support for city bombing. The US Air Force abandons precision bombing for radar bombing in Germy and fireboming in Japan during World War II. Competition between organizations also do not account for civilian victimization. Military organizations are always competing with each other and yet they do not always kill civilians. The Royal Air Force and Luftwaffe were independent but still bombed civilians. The US Air Force exhibited similar behavior both before and after independence so the drive for independence cannot explain its behavior.

Downes concludes that desperation and annexation are the best explanations for civilian targeting and fatalities. Democracy by itself is not a critical factor; it only matters in combination with desperation. Perceptions of identity are not critical and organizational culture and interests are not the key.

Kathryn McNabb Cochran (discussant):
Cochran comments that all of the arguments presented in the panel are based on the idea that political actors chose to target civilians for strategic reasons, but most focus on the costs of targeting civilians relative to other strategies. Cochran argues that although this is important, it would be helpful to conceptualize these calculations in a wider cost benefit analysis that includes moral and reputational costs of civilian vicitimization, the chance that targeting civilians will bring in outside powers, the dollar cost, and manpower costs. In addition, its important to weigh the benefits of civilian targeting against the probability that a given strategy will allow you to achieve your goals on the battlefield but also political goals.

In addition, Cochran notes that all of the theories of civilian targeting presented here rely on the assumption that targeting civilians is rational, or at least that the groups that employ this strategy believe it is rational. That is that targeting civilians will help them achieve their strategic goals. Cochran argues that this idea of rationality needs to be addressed more explicitly.

The assumption of rationality can actually be disaggregated into two assumptions. First, that when targeted civilians react by pressuring their government or the insurgent group controlling their territory to give into the party. Second, that the government or the insurgent group cares. It is unclear whether either of these conditions hold and its worth studying them empirically.

The answers to these questions change how the research program on civilian targeting should frame its main question. If we find that targeting civilians is rational, then the more interesting question is why don't we see more states targeting civilians. If we find that targeting civilians is irrational, then the question is why do leaders believe that targeting civilians will help them achieve their war aims. What we can do to make it a less appealing strategy. These questions will give leverage on appropriate policy responses to this problem.

Finally, on a more specific level I think information here is key. When you focus on guerrilla warfare, we saw that information allows different actors to be discriminate or

indiscriminate in their violence. If it is the case that lack of information leads to indiscriminate violence, it would be even more problematic in interstate wars where they do not have as much local knowledge. But that begs that question, why do we see more indiscriminate violence in civil wars.

Question and Answer:

Q1. Ole Holsti asked Alex Downes: Many of the wars you look at include both sides targeting civilians. Does your analysis address who targets civilians initially

> Alex: When I look at democratic initiations, there is no difference. Whether the democracy is an initiator or target it does not matter. In statistical analysis I controlled for whether the states had their own civilians targeted. I did find that this was the case and that often reciprocal targeting did occur. Depends on the access of that strategy to the other side.

Q2: (Weinbuger) Valentino needs to look at the time factor in targeting civilians. In World War I, the Germans are targeting civilians in Belgium in august 1914. They start the bombing of cities far removed. Ironically, the British are planning to retaliate and building planes for this purpose when the war ends. In World War II, in the two days before Britain and France declare war on Germany, the German air force is leveling polish cities. When the British do begin flying over Germany, they drop leaflets. It seems to me there is a considerable difference here between dropping leaflets and dropping bombs, starting from September 1939. After they declare war, they are very careful. It is interesting to follow RAF restrictions. They try and avoid collateral damage. Need to disaggregate the time variable to capture this. The Americans turn to bomb in 1945. The Japanese turn to bombing in 1942. If you disaggregate for time, regime type matters.

> Alex: World War II- I would put it at November 1943 with Radar bombing. They also launch area raids at that time. This correlates with the massive losses in August 1943. They consciously shift to area and radar bombing. Looking at the Germans and the British, I did not know about the earlier Polish bombings. My research has shown that bombing did not begin until they thought a siege was possible. The leaflet dropping is a deterrence strategy. The Germans fear what the British will do to them and the British fear what the Germans will do to them. Germans are very careful until September of 1940 when they are faced with operational failure and high casualty rates. Until then they are careful to stay away from terror bombings.
> Valentino: Several of the German conquests are exactly that, they are conquests and in those cases we should see targeting earlier in the campaign. In Poland, these are areas that are being annexed. Because the allies are not trying to annex territory, we would expect that targeting would not occur until later.

Debrah: Valention and Huth, how do measure civilian support? Also you found that democracy was significant, can you comment on that given Alex's contrary findings? How does the strategy variable vary, what other strategies do you look at. Finally, with regard to war aims, what is the continuum and where do regime change and annexation

fall on that continuum.   Avant praises Kalyvas for looking at the fine grained data but also for focusing on criminology. There is a grey zone between much of what happens in war and crime but there is also evidence of an increase in crime during wars. There are many opportunities to expand this conversation.

> Huth: On democracy, across the research our first study that mainly looked at civil wars found that democratic states are less likely to kill civilians. Under difficult circumstances, where they face a strong insurgency with high civilian support the actual probability of the democracy killing civilians is still relatively high. Compared to nondemocracies there is a difference but its still rather high. In our current work on interstate wars we have not found any evidence that democracies are less likely to kill civilians but we have found evidence in the opposite direction that democracies are slightly more likely to kill civilians in larger numbers. We need to do more work on that.
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> Valentino: One quick hypothesis for the difference between the two studies. If we expect norms to influence democratic decisions with regard to targeting civilians we should be more likely to see these norms at work with regard to their own citizens.
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> Huth: Other strategies that we looked at included maneuver/mobility strategies, decisive engagement, reactive defense, attrition, and counter insurgency. War aims included limited territorial goals, policy goals, total annexation, conquest, regime change.
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> Downes: I've contrasted annexation and regime change as separate categories, but they do increase the likelihood. On the criminology question, there was a study on domestic attitudes on the death penalty and their feelings about casualties in war.

Q2. The participant commented that attrition is not a strategy but an outcome of a failed strategy. Within counterinsurgency there are multiple strategies, it's a type of war not a strategy. What is the threshold for "high costs" and does this threshold change? When does desperation kick in. In Somalia 22 soldiers died and we pulled out. In Iraq we have 2200 dead and we are still there. This is pretty costly. It's a war for regime change, it's a brutal counterinsurgency, and the cost are high. Have we not passed the desperation point and if not, why not?

- Valentino: No explicit cut off for "high cost" it is a continuous variables measured by military casualties. More casualties increases the probability of targeting civilians. Also 2200 casualties over a three year long war is not that high by historical standards. Its actually quite low given the number of troops stationed there. This is probably why we do not see. It may also be that the American military believes targeting civilians is not an effective way to win the war. But if the survival of the country was at stake, it might be different
- Alex: Casualties as an independent variable it changes the likelihood, there is not an iron law and there are exceptions. Twenty two hundred dead is different from the magnitude of deaths in Korea or Vietnam. I would maybe compare it to the British in Malaya. There is room for more explanation here.

Q3: Sarah To the extent that greed operates as a motivation in civil war particularly among rival rebel groups, should we see the targeting of civilians despite the fact that the

aims are limited? I'm thinking of Sierra Leon, the Congo where they target civilians just to create terror. Where do those types of war fit given that wars aims are more limited?
- Huth and Valentino: Didn't look at rebel violence in civil wars. We only looked at government violence.
- Kalyvas: There is a type of correlation between these wars because they arenot guerrilla wars in the classic sense because you do not have a state. There are only competing militias. But they do have frontlines and territorial control still matters. They are not asymmetric wars; they are symmetric wars and have similarity between primitive wars. They are not trying to control the population in these scenarios.

Q4:   (Gelpi) How do you measure territorial control? How did you come up with the numbers of targeting killings.
- Kalyvas: I got most of the data from archival research, civil registries, and interviews. The variable is disaggregated into total government control, partial control where rebels attack irregularly, partial control where they attack every night, partial control where the government has hardly any presence in the territory and only visit irregularly, and total rebel control where the government has no presence in the territory.
- Gelpi: Its an ordinal scale you created by going through the archives.

Q5: At what decision making level is desperation measured?
- Downes: at very high levels of national leaders and the leaders of the military branch
- Huth and Valentino: central governments. This can be problematic because local commanders are often carrying out the decision. This can often lead to inertia, where they are slow to start targeting civilians but also slow to stop.

Q6: (Joe) At what level foes desperation manifest itself? Who is desperate?
Alex: National leadership or the leadership of the military branch that is taking the beating. Civilians controlling them still have veto power even if the decision is being promoted by a military branch.
Huth: Looking at central governments. We do not theorize about lower levels within the military.
Joe: Doesn't deal with the Mi Lai factor where lower level commanders are making decisions without knowledge of national commanders.

Q7: (Alex) How do you deal with the problem of intentionality? If a state implements a blockade or bombs urban infrastructure, civilian deaths could be collateral damage or they could be the result of intentional targeting. There is a difference between targeting civilians and accepting civilian casualties. Civilian casualties are not synonymous with intentionality.
- Valentino: We use total number of civilian casualties and intentionality as different dependent variables and we get the same result. In addition, cases with really large numbers of civilian casualties it is normally intentional.

- Huth: Because we know that governments are likely to attribute civilian deaths to collateral damage, we supplement government documents with historical accounts. We do not view government statements as reliable sources.
- Downes: Getting around this problem is the reason I use multiple dependent variables, including civilians killed and a dummy variable for targeting civilians.

Q7: (Alan) What about civilian deaths that are not the result of battle. The sanctions against Iraq killed lots of civilians but the U.S. was not desperate and it was not trying to annex territory? Sometimes is targeting civilians the first choice or is it only happen when belligerents are desperate? If it is only in desperation, its not that interesting but if it is a first choice it is much more interesting.
- Downes: In wars of annexation, you see targeting occurring at the beginning of the war but in wars of attrition, you see targeting civilians as a last resort most of the time. There are some exceptions such as Italy in 1935. Those outliers can help us come up with contingent theories to bound are arguments. On the sanctions issue, I am only studying declared wars.
- Huth: Our statistical models do not take into account when a state chooses to target civilians but out case studies do take into account sequencing and timing. We predict that there will probably be very few instances where civilian targeting is used early in a campaign. Except possibly in areas where state chose to do it preemptively if they believe civilians will rise up against them in the future.
- Kalyvas: When looking at the timing we should consider the extent to which the parties learn from their past experience. For example, in Darfur the warring parties had fought before. In addition, we need to control for the fact that norms develop over a larger time period and also for cases of total war.

Q8. How can we educate the public about intentional acts of violence during war? How can we integrate criminology into this discussion? Why is the information so filtered that the general population does not know about these events? Would expanding education help curb this practice?
- Downes: I am pessimistic about the benefits of education. An increase in knowledge of civilian victimization does not usually translate into third party involvement. Look at genocide, we just avoid the use of the word in Rwanda, we declared it in Darfur but are doing nothing.
- Kohn: If you look at 1945 to the present you see some positive trends. You see the international criminal court, a globalized media, and other international institutions. Globalization has meant the globalization of norms and information. Over the long span there has been improvement in uneven ways.

Panel II: Casualties and the Rules of Engagement
Col. Lyle W. Cayce:
  Col. Cayce argues that it has never been the U.S. policy to deliberately target civilians. Does that mean we do not target civilians? Yes. Does that mean that we do not hurt civilians? No. If we make a decision to shoot at a convoy that might contain an al-Qaeda leader but also 20 civilians, the question becomes it that leader a military target and is taking him out a military necessity. Is it important enough to risk possibly killing

those 25 civilians for that one military target? We may disagree over this cost/benefit calculation but we are always shooting at a military target, never at a civilian target.

Concern for limiting civilian casualties influenced the prosecution of the war at all stages, not only in planning and preparing for the war but also in the tactical and targeting decisions made during the war. Lawyers play a particularly important role in this regard, advising commanders during the planning and implementation process. When Col. Cayce war deployed to Iraq, he had 12 other lawyers with him to help commanders make targeting decisions. The greater involvement of lawyers in these decisions reflects a desire to avoid violating the rule of law but also because complying with the law of war helps us achieve our political and strategic goals.

In preparing for war, the military analyzes the impact of bombing potential targets. They used, among other things ADOCS, the Automated Deep Operations Coordination System, to anticipate the potential for collateral damage. This system tracks enemy and friendly movement, plots and monitors protected property as well as no fire and restricted fire area, and helps predict possible collateral damage. In addition, during training both commanders and soldiers are educated about the Rules of Engagement Restrictions, such as the no strike list and restricted target list, as well as rules of engagement clearance procedures when certain weapons were involved or when anticipated civilian casualties were hi.

CENTCOM developed collateral damage methodology the help predict the amount of collateral damage given the type of target, type of delivery system, and the type of munitions. Where expected collateral damage was high, or when targets involved areas in the no fire or restricted fire zones, clearance from higher headquarters was required, except for cases of counter-fires and imminent self defense. CENTCOM also required positive identification, reasonable certainty that the target was a legitimate military object. In addition, if it was predicted that bombing a target would result in more than 20 civilian casualties, it required the Secretary of Defense's approval. At times, when he was not reachable and time was a critical factor, lower level commanders were given the power to make this decision.

During battle, in both offensive and defensive mission potential collateral damage and civilian casualties were always considered. Prior to targeting an area the army would consider the proximity of proposed targets to protected property and civilian areas. Potential collateral damage influenced not only what targets were attacked but also what types of weapons were used, when they were used, etc. The pace of this process depended on many things, including whether US troops were taking fire.

Col Cayce gave examples of how the army used radars to trace where fire was coming from. How the soldiers used this information combined with information from ADOCS about civilian population, cultural sites, and restricted/no fire zones to see if returning fire was proportional. In every engagement, the military required self validation to see if the computers information was consistent with what was occurring on the ground. Of the 512 counter battery fires that Col. Cayce was involved in, most involved almost no collateral damage. There were 35 contentious cases and many times the army chose not to return fire.

He gave an example from Bagdhad, where the army chose to return fire against artillery that was attacking U.S. foces in the South but initially did not respond to anti-aircraft fire because it did not pose an immediate threat. Eventually, these weapons were

taken out after 2 A10s had been shot down. He gives another example where artillery fire from the city was taken out using the Air Forces precision weapons because of the high potential for collateral damage, while a nearby target on the outskirts of the city used MLRS. There was still collateral damage but the choice of weapons was made to limit civilian casualties was much as possible.

In summary, the US Army took many precautions to limit civilian casualties during the Iraq war. Despite this, many civilians did die, testifying to the fact that "virtual war" is a myth. Technological advances make weapons more lethal and accurate, but no efforts to mitigate or avoid civilian casualties will be completely successful during combat. He notes that we went into Iraq to liberate the people and the U.S did not want to destroy village to save it. Civilian casualties complicate post combat reconstruction and governance phase of the operation and trying to limit civilian casualties helps the military achieve those long term goals. Finally, he concludes by noting that although the army prefers direct fire munitions, these were not always available. One of the key lessons from the Iraq War was that many of our weapons were designed for the cold war and we need to have access to more precision weapons.

Colin Kahl:
- At the JRTC there are more than 750 civilians on battle space, 250 are Arabs living in diaspora communities in America. Why did you take the job? You do it to help to try and teach soldiers to understand Iraqis and who knows maybe the wrong people won't get killed
- Are we killing the right people in Iraq. To what degree is the U.S. complying with laws of armed combat and particularly with the norm of noncombatant immunity.
- Noncombatant immunity:
- Norms: are collective understandings—given an actors identity. If you are a good person. Good people don't do this.
-Just War Norms: Jus ad Bellum, Jus in Bello norms specifically
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Kahl looks at U.S. compliance with the norm of noncombatant immunity as a function of organizational culture. He begins his discussion by defining the norms as collective understandings that prescribe or proscribe behavior by defining actions as appropriate or inappropriate for actors with a given identity. He is concerned with just war norms and specifically jus in bello, justice in war, which refers to the way the war conducted and includes the norm of noncombatant immunity. The two components of the norm of noncombatant immunity are the principal of distinction, which requires belligerents to differentiate between combatants and noncombatants. This component of the norm proscribes targeting civilians. The second component is the principal of proportionality, which requires that belligerents way the costs to noncombatants against potential military gains when attacking military targets. This norm has been codified in international law, specifically in The Hague and Geneva Conventions and the 1977 additional protocols. The U.S. has signed the Hague and Geneva Conventions but has

not signed the additional protocols. Most law articles, handbooks, ect treat these as customary international law which is binding for the U.S.

Looking at a variety of sources, he asses U.S. compliance with this norm in the current Iraq War. He disaggregates the Iraq case into Major Combat Operations and Stability/Counterinsurgency Operations. He argues that Iraq is an important case because it has explicit policy implications and because it is a hard case for norms given the high costs of the war. It's a super power fighting a large scale costly war where its national interests are supposedly engaged. These are the situations when norms should be least binding.

Kahl defines compliance is the extent to which actors recognize normative obligations and attempt to bring their actions in line with those obligations. There is not one specific way to measure compliance so Kahl uses 5 or 6 different measures to capture this idea, including the number of civilian casualties, pre-war behavior, pre-planned targeting, the rules of engagement, conduct during operations, and the way the military responded to instances of non-compliance. He looks at DOD docments, conducted interviews with JAG officers, observations at training facilities, histories, military journals and logs to get a sense of the degree of compliance.

Compliance is not the same thing is efficacy so looking at total numbers of civilian casualties. Wars are designed to kill people and break things. People will die even if people comply with laws of war. The purpose of the laws of war is to limit dying and suffering not to eliminate it completely. Looking at civilian casualties if you compare Iraq to other wars.   Kahl presents estimates from a number of sources, ranging from the Project on Defense Alternatives 4,300 high estimate to the Lancet's 98,000 civilian deaths.[1] Although the average number, around 25,000 is low relative to WWII, Vietnam, and Korea it is high compared to the Gulf War, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. When measured by deaths per ton of bombs dropped, this relationship still holds. When compared to only other counter insurgency campaigns, the average number of civilian deaths per month per 1000 people in the population is low in Iraq. Kahl concludes that there is no evidence from the casualties data alone that suggest that there is systematic noncompliance with the norm of noncombatant immunity. The U.S. is actually doing better today then they have in the past wars.

Unfortunately large numbers of Iraqi civilians are continuing to die. One reason for this is the fact that distinguishing between insurgents and civilians is really difficult. You have a society where everyone has AK47 and are walking around, its difficult to tell who are combatants. If you look at the Iraq Body Count data, you can see that 60% of casualties are military aged men. Some of them are probably insurgents but we cannot know. Insurgents also place themselves in places with lots of civilians for propaganda purposes but also because it makes sense strategically. If they think the U.S. will not bomb civilian areas putting military targets near mosques or schools will restrain the U.S. The vast majority of operations are occurring in very dense urban environments where it is very difficult to avoid civilian casualties. In addition, insurgents are also killing civilians.

He provides evidence that the U.S. has taken steps during the planning stages of the operation to limit civilian casualties. They have stringent rules of engagement, target

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[1] PDA's estimate only includes casualties caused by US led forces. Lancet's estimate are all civilians killed during the war.

selection is an arduous process that predicts levels of collateral damage and weighs those against military necessity. The U.S. also chooses its weapons in order to limit civilian casualties. They drop leaflets to try and warn civilians prior to the war. In Falluja and Talafur, they evacuated civilians prior to the operation.

There are types of noncompliance: individual misconduct, loose interpretations of hostile intent, inconsistent compliance in systems in self defense, in adequate preparation during the transition between major combat and counterinsurgency phases, intelligence problems, and questionable weapons selection. But all norms are violated. The question is how does society respond to these violations. The military responds by adjusting ROES, changing how they select weapons, improve training. They have also investigated some instances of non compliance and have worked at changing policy and doctrine to be more sensitive to collateral damage issues.

Kahl provides two competing hypotheses for explaining compliance. First, he investigates the realist hypotheses. The argues that realists expect compliance with the norm of combatant immunity when the norm facilitates victory but expect non-compliance when it doesn't. Second, realists expect that compliance with the norm is a function of costs: as the cost of the war goes up, compliance goes down. Kahn argues that this explains compliance during Major Operations but does not explain compliance during the Stability Operations/Counter Insurgency Phase. He argues that realist theory would predict one of two approaches to the counterinsurgency: 1) US would use overwhelming and indiscriminate force directed at insurgents and their population, or 2) the US would focus on winning over the population primarily though indirect means such as political legitimacy, economic development, etc. In reality, the U.S. chose neither approach, choosing instead to use overwhelming force discriminately directed only at insurgents and exercised in a lawful way. Realist Theory is further hurt by the fact that compliance has remained high even as the costs of the Iraq war have escalated. Kahl argues that costs are higher than the last panel assert. Its possible that this war may break the army, which would be a significant cost.

Kahl argues that organizational culture can better account for U.S. compliance in the Iraq case. Specifically, he argues that two aspects of contemporary military culture have influenced US compliance with noncombatant immunity. The US military is influenced by traditional organizational culture which privileges the application of overwhelming force to annihilate the enemy. Second, since the Vietnam War after the Mi Lai Masscre, this culture has been tempered by an organizational commitment to socializing service members in jus in bello principals. Together, these cultural imperatives create the annihilation-restraint paradox, which embraces lawful application of overwhelming force. This explains US compliance. It also explains U.S. counterinsurgency strategy and the fact that we see relatively high levels of civilian casualties despite high U.S. compliance.

Joe Caddel (discussant):
I thought the emphasis was very interesting. The logic was clean, crisp and easy to follow. I always get nervous when people bring up casualty numbers, but he does not think that any of the assumptions Kahl uses to get these numbers would influence your conclusions. I'd cheat and ask the first three questions. First, to what extent has the military culture accepted the presence of lawyers? Is there resistance? Second, does the

culture go all the way down to the individual level? Third, what about the British—do they similar legal rules to follow?

> - Cayce: There is not a lot of resistance to JAGS anymore. It is built into the army culture. There were about 35 missions in civilian casualties. My commanders never went against my advice about whether shooting targets were within the laws of war. At times the commander went beyond my legal advice as far as protecting civilians. With respect to training, we do train individuals. Normally we do not advise individual snipers but given the importance of that mosque, I can see us making that decision. With regard to the British, I know that they do abide by the laws of war but they do not have as many JAGS as we do but they are very good at training their commanders.

Question and Answer:
Debrah Avant: Given the fact the fact that many people in Iraq that would be fighting the war or helping with logistics as military members are now civilian contractors, what impact do you think this had

> Cacey: Having contractors on the battlefield poses many problems because their status under international law is not clear. The way we handled it was that contractors should not have arms with them unless they chose to arm themselves. We told them that we preferred that they not arm themselves and rely on the army for security. We never decided what their legal status goes. We probably would have argued that they were civilians accompanying the force and that they should be awarded special privileges, but the situation did not arise. Question is still not resolved.
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> Kahl: In most contracts, there are clear specifications about compliance. Enforcement may not be bad. It is a very interesting question and it could be the case that we are externalizing certain types of non compliance to the contracting community. This could be a problem.

Kathryn McNabb Cochran: You dismiss the rationalist approach to quickly. Its possible that even if we do not see a balance at the strategic level between winning the hearts and minds and killing the bad guys. But if you bring that down to the tactical and operational level we may see this cost/benefit analysis. Much of the evidence that you all discuss supports this as military commanders way the benefits of specific targets against expected numbers of civilian casualties. Its hard to adjudicate between that argument and your organizational argument because they make the same prediction. We have to look at individual decisions to see if it is culture or a cost/benefit analysis. My second question, regards methodology. You only look at Iraq and there is no variation in your dependent variable. You either need to look at other cases where there was noncompliance to see if culture is different or disaggregate Iraq into smaller cases.

> Kahl: This is part of a larger project that will go from World War II to the present. As you well know a country is not the same thing as a case. There are probably two or three counterinsurgency phases and the major combat phase. This last phase we are moving more toward the indirect phase. There is no one approach to counterinsurgency. There are ½ dozen units that run different areas. There is variation among different units. The explanation for this ties into organizational

culture. The knee jerk reaction of many people in the army is to find and kill the bad guys, it is the exception to use indirect approaches. These units are facing the same costs but they chose different tactics. Only culture can explain this.

Q3: (?) I just got back from Iraq and I think you have really captured what has happened in Iraq, especially for never being there. It is not only difficult to count the number of civilian casualties; it is equally difficult to tell the cause of civilian deaths. Even if civilians die in an engagement; that does not necessarily mean that the U.S. caused their death.

Q4. (Valentino) Something has changed in the American military on the issue of targeting civilians. What has changed exactly? I think it happened after Vietnam. Kahn, you focus on changing norms. I wonder if perceptions have changed about what is effective. You pointed to realist approaches of killing everyone or an indirect approach. There has not been much evidence to suggest that either of those approaches works. Nothing really works when there is a strong counter insurgency. We do not have evidence across counterinsurgency wars. What is the balance between normative shift and a conclusion that this is just not a useful strategy.

> Cayce: Military people by their nature are very pragmatic. We have made a decision that it is best to achieve our strategic goal to minimizing casualties. This is coalition war. There was an international debate. If we have many atrocities our allies are going to jump ship. We understand that press is important and that public perceptions are important and large numbers of civilian casualties would complicate this matter.
>
> Kahl: What has changed? The media environment has changed. As the insurgency has turned into Sunni insurgency there is an ethnic cleansing solution. But no one contemplates that solution for a good reason. But I'm not sure those reasons have to do with the efficacy of the solutions, more likely it is the immorality of that solution. It is off the table to begin with. Its interesting that it is off the table now. There are also harder strategies of counterinsurgency that are off the table, like some that we used in the Phillipines—concentration camps, curfews where you are killed if you are out at night. If the argument is that its organizational learning and the military has learned to try and win hearts and minds, why did we choose a strategy that is still alienating civilians. This strategy was bound to loose the war and alienate civilians in order to comply with the laws of war. That doesn't make sense.

Q5. (Stephen Biddle) Is there common ground between strategic arguments of Downes and Huth and Valention and the cultural argument of Kahl? Is the difference is stark as it seems? Why do we see such different findings given that we are looking at the same empirical record.

> Kahl: It is both as big as it seems and smaller than it seems. Wars are different from the 1990s. Its hard to compare the World Wars or the Crimean War with today's wars because the information and media environments are different. Second, it all depends on the cost threshold. One could argue that we are still below that threshold, that costs are not sufficiently high to warrant targeting

civilians. But costs are high to the organizations and those organizations have an incentive to try and win. It could be that their arguments explain major wars where national survival is at stake, while our arguments do a better job at explaining what is happening in these lower level conflicts. There is still a difference of opinion.

Alex: We are not looking at the same empirical record. If you look at the past 100-200 years, my work and Valentino and Huth's work performs very well. If you just look at the past 10 or 15 years our theories do not do as well but those was are at the low end of the cost spectrum. In the past, organization culture has gone away when costs have rised.

Kahl: Compliance is getting higher as costs are going up.

Q6. (Stathis Kalyvas) I think the reason for forgoing the indirect approach is compelling but I think resources better explains why we did not undergo the kill everyone approach. (Not sure which strategy he is talking about) We did not have enough people or enough time to use this strategy. The Iraq case may not be the best case to look at norms because it requires a country with sophisticated organizational skills, advanced technology, ect. It might be better to look at poor actors. Are they effected by international norms. That would be the critical case.

Kahl: Its not clear that very brutal strategies are off the table. There have been cases where these strategies have been successful—Chechnya and Algeria for example. It is just off the table for us. In terms of evacuations, the first concern was to limit civilian casualties. The second concern was to sift the population for insurgents, but that is really hard to do. Rich countries can do it but that is not sufficient. The U.S. has been rich for a long time but it is only now beginning to comply. Russia is also wealthy and they are much more brutal than us.

Panel III: Impact of Casualties on the Military
Steve Biddle:
Biddle discusses the relationship between casualties and the nature and size of the defense budget and the evolution of defense doctrine and force structure. The level of casualty tolerance has influenced the composition and size of the defense budget. Acceptable levels of U.S. casualties shape how much the military needs to spend in order to attain those levels. The easiest way to see this is to compare the Cold War with the 1990's. During the cold war our military objectives amounted to us trying to lose slowly enough to allow to use theater nuclear weapons before the Soviets reached the chnanel. The expectation was that in a war against a major power in Europe casualties would be very high. That was the cost of the mission, and that was assumed to be the natural thing. Turing the 90's the acceptable level of casualties has shrunk and since 2000, this level has shrunk even further from a few thousand to a few hundred. The budgetary question then become how much you need to spend on defense in order to keep casualties at an acceptable level. In general, you need a much larger budget to achieve goals with keeping mil casualties down. This goes a long way toward explaining why we continue

to spend at almost Cold War levels even after the magnitude of the threat fell with the breakup of the USSR: the threat got smaller, but our objectives became much more demanding.

Sensitivity to casualties also changes the kind of military you need to buy. Given the increasing demand for success at low casualty levels, the defense department has moved the bulk of combat activity away from close combat and emphasize standoff precision strike, in which Americans are taken further and further away from enemy fire. This keeps the Americans out of harm's way and thus allows us to destroy the enemy without exposing ourselves to fire. This works great sometimes, especially when the enemy is permissive but does not work well when the enemy is not permissive. Biddle gives as an example the Iraqis during major operations where they tried to protect tanks with sandbars. They were permissive even in urban environments. The defensive benefits of fighting in an urban environment come from fighting indoors but most Iraqis were outside.

This isn't the only way that people fight. There is a lot of variation in hostile tactical behavior. For example the resistance was much tougher in the later phases of the Afghanistan War. When we fight against opponents like al-Qeada, whose tactical proficiency is sufficient enough to exploit inherent complexity of the earth surface for this degree of cover and concealment, it is very difficult for us to solve these problems from standoff positions. If you insist on being successful, you have to engage in close combat.

The move from move from close combat engagement to standoff precision strike is based on the false assumption that close combat means heavy casualties whereas standoff precision means low casualties. Against, unskilled enemies, even close combat can be prosecuted with low levels of U.S. casualties, for example, the VII Corps against the Republican Guard in Desert Strom. Moreover, against adept enemies, stand off precision is only casualty-free if you're willing to tolerate failure. Effective local concealment, of they type we saw in Afghanistan and in the later phases of the Iraq conflict, make it difficult to prosecute standoff-precision based strategies. The problem is that the only way to solve this tactical problem is to engage in close combat. In these situations, skillful enemies may be able to prevent the U.S. from achieving its tactical goals, unless the U.S. is willing to risk casualties. This could be problematic because by focusing on standoff strategies prior to the war, the close combat skills that U.S. needs may erode, potentially increasing our net casualties against skilled enemies rather than decreasing them.

Sensitivity to civilian casualties can be equally problematic for United States ability to achieve its tactical and operational goals. Take urban warfare as an example. In order to avoid civilian casualties, the U.S. could refuse to engage in close combat in urban areas. Instead we set up a loose corridor around major urban populations and give civilians the option of leaving prior to combat. They would then employ a variety of tactics to route out insurgents and use precision air strikes to put pressure on the insurgent leadership and induce political collapse. But this doesn't work. Its wishful thinking. In Basara, the resistance did not leave and eventually the British had to engage them in close combat. In Baghdad, the U.S. was able to rid the city of opposition because they destroyed them in close combat.

We believe that precision warfare we can cause political outcomes coercively that will avoid us having to come into combat in close quarters that will cause us to risk our own casualties while inflicting civilian casualties. That potentially is a very dangerous idea unless we will only face opponents in the future that look like the Iraqi Republican Guard.

Conrad Crane:
Crane explores how public expectations have shaped the way the U.S. military addresses civilian casualties. In the 30's everyone expected that using airpower would resort in civilian casualties. Even then, the U.S. military knew that there were drawbacks to targeting civilians. They wanted to use precision weapons to limit effects on civilians but the weapons couldn't do this. Precision bombing covered a half mile squared. That is not putting a missile down a ventilator shaft. You have this interesting relationship between what the military and what the public understands it can do. There is reluctance in Air Force public relations circles to admit what precision bombing really is. There is an assumption that the public supports what we are doing because we are trying to be accurate. The public supported the Air Force because they thought they were being accurate.

You can look at precision as a guide for technology development. The benefits of this new technology are based on assumptions of near perfect intelligences- which isn't realistic. But touting the benefits of these weapons influences public expectations. This has reinforced the myth that war can be thought of as laser surgery. Although our weapons are good, many things can go wrong. We don't want virtual wars. If war is easy, then we may be more likely to use it to achieve our political aims.

During Desert Fox, after the U.S. had successfully suppressed air defense centers in the no fly zones, the Iraqis moved anti-aircraft guns into residential neighborhoods, put their command and control center in the historic ruins of Nineva hoping that the U.S. would either not fire at them or if the U.S. did fire they could use collateral damage to garner international sympathy for their cause. Worried about possible civilian casualties, the Turkish government limited the number of days our planes could fly out of our air bases and forbade us from flying at night.

In addition, precision weapons make mistakes difficult to explain. When we accidentally bombed the Chinese embassy during the Kosovo campaign, the Chinese assumed it was a deliberate attack because our technology was perfect, thus the attack must have been deliberate.

Crane also argues that international support for campaigns often relies on perfect wars. He claims that the reason many of our allies were on board during the Kosovo War was because we would win this war bloodlessly. Crane cites Wesley Clark's lamentations about consensus building during the Kosovo campaign. The U.S. wanted to attack power generation facilities and communications hubs during the first night, but other allied members did not want to sign on. There was even concern about bombing enemy barracks because conscripts might be killed. Every nation had to approve every target. This creates problems when trying to define dual use targets. There was an international outcry when the NATO hit the television station and killed 12 civilians.

One of the consequences of casualty aversion in the military is the fact that the U.S. avoid killing civilians but does not necessarily avoid inconveniencing them when

deciding to hit dual use targets such as electricity and communication facilities. But in the long term this can be just as harmful to civilians.

There are a number of moral implications to casualty aversion as well. First, its possible that if we can wage war in a relatively costless way, war may become more prevalent. Second, often the best way to win a war is to win it quickly and decisively. This can require overwhelming force and often lots of violence. But by ending the war quickly, lives are spared. If casualty aversion prompts the U.S. to proceed more cautiously, its possible that more people will die in the long run. Finally, by not risking U.S. casualties, the U.S. strategy is implicitly saying that Kosovar lives are worth less than American lives. We should not be killing people unless we are prepared to die.

The legacy of Vietnam is the belief within the military that the American public will not tolerate casualties. This has led to an overemphasis on force protection, a preference for standoff warfare and use overwhelming force, and a belief that the more force you use, the less effective you are, and a belief that the best tactics in counterinsurgency campaign do not involve violence. This is not the appropriate lesson because counterinsurgency missions are hard and dangerous and political and social tools won't win those wars.

Debra Avant:
Avant looks at how the public reacts to the deaths different kinds of security personal, specifically the deaths of civilian contractors in Iraq compared to the deaths of soldiers. She notes that much of the literature on war and its costs assume that war is fought with armies of soldiers fighting as citizens of a state. Empirically this makes sense – as in the modern era the legitimate use of force has been tied to the state and military service has been seen as one important element of citizenship. However, who fights for the state has varied quite a bit. In fact, there really is a continuum of the degree to which soldiers fight as citizens, ranging from a citizen army where all citizens are required to perform military service to a private army of non-citizens.

Citizen Army: Required Service	Citizen Army: Draft	Professional Army	Private Army: Nationals	Private Army: Non-Nationals

This is interesting now because the U.S. is increasingly using private soldiers. Though the trend began long before the US invaded Iraq in 2003, the Iraqi conflict – where private soldiers were killed and mutilated in Fallujah and then implicated in the prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib – has made this trend much more apparent. In April 2003 Secretary Rumsfeld estimated that as many as 20,000 private security contractors were operating in Iraq. He then listed a number of companies, most of which were providing a particular type of security service – site security and personal security details. Many more companies and personnel were deployed to do more mundane military tasks – from providing logistics support to operational support for weapons systems to training the Iraqi Army and Police. Once you count all of these, the numbers more than double – leading to estimates that closer to 60,000 private personnel were actually in theater at the time Rumsfeld made his statement. Even using Rumsfeld's much lower number makes private security personnel the second largest member of the coalition of the willing. Using the larger one PSCs constitute more than ¼ of the forces the US has deployed.

And this member of the coalition has suffered its share of casualties. There have been 428 reported casualties, but this number underestimates casualties because it does not include subcontractors.

Avant then lay out some of the possible implications of turning to private soldiers. First, it may the case that using private soldiers will be politically less costly. As put by one advocate for increased privatization of forces – "body bags filled with private soldiers simply don't strain political will the way military casualties do." Secondly, citizen armies will perform better in wars that serve the national interest but for smaller wars professional armies will be better. Eliot Cohen asserts that small wars – by definition not vital to national interest – are best fought with professional armies as "using volunteers reduces the potential for violent domestic protest that accompanies using conscripts". Citizen soldiers are said to evoke empathy because they are of the polity and are fighting not of choice but of a requirement of citizenship.

Both of these arguments assume that sensitivity to casualties is higher the closer this connection between citizenship and military service and the lower the choice in the matter. Thus, one might imagine that the public would be more sensitive to the deaths of citizen soldiers and gradually become less sensitive as you move along the continuum toward professional and then private soldiers. Thus a prominent hypothesis is that the deaths of private soldiers will elicit less response from the public and be associated with less decline of support for a mission than the deaths of active duty personnel, whether volunteers or conscripts.

Avant presents some evidence, she and Lee Sigelman have been collecting using survery experiments on George Washington undergrads. They have the students read identical news stories, one with soldiers dying and one with private security guards dying. They found the exact opposite of what the general policy view expected. Those who read about soldiers dying actually supported the war more – those who read about private soldiers supported it less.

Avant conjectures that this could be due to the fact that the public responds not only to the number of casualties but also what purpose those who died were serving. A vast literature on the way people use low-cost information and inferences to make political judgments, suggests ways in which soldiers' deaths might matter very differently than contractors' deaths for any rallying potential.   When soldiers – even volunteer soldiers – die, it may communicate a message to the public about the importance and legitimacy of a mission, invoking symbols of patriotism, sacrifice, legitimacy, and national interest. The use of private security should not have the same symbolic potency and may link more easily to symbols of commercialism, profiteering, private interest, and even illegitimacy. A competing hypothesis, then, is that deaths of soldiers will lead to greater support for a conflict, deaths of contractors to less support.

In order to test this hypothesis, Avant and Sigelman designed a Knowledge network experiment. In this experiment, participants read one of three stories: on the federal bueracracy, on the death of soldiers in Iraq, or on the death of private security guards. They then answered an in depth survey that asked a series of questions about their emotional state, whether they supported the decision for the war, whether they thought the war was worth it, how they thought the war was going, and whether they thought those that died were motivated by patriotic service, doing their job, or material gain.

There were strong differences in the perceptions of the motivations of the soldiers and the contractors. Only 8% of those who read a story about soldiers dying thought these soldiers had been motivated by material gain; 39% said they had been motivated to do their job; and 53% said their motivation had been to serve their country. By contrast, 27% of those who had read about contract soldiers dying ascribed their motivation to material gain and only 23% saw it as a matter of serving their country; and as you can, the likelihood of citing material gain as the contractors' motivation was even greater among respondents who read the elaborated story about the private security industry. However, the perceived differences in motivations were not related to the type of death reported and identical emotional reactions were recorded for the two groups that read about anyone dying. They also found no significant differences in support for US involvement in Iraq and in evaluations of how well the situation there was going between those who read about soldiers dying and those who read about contractors dying.

Avant noted that reacting to the different news stories does not necessarily capture how public opinion at the aggregate level rises and falls. Avant and Siegelman looked at the exposure of information over time, and found that news news coverage of soldiers dwarfs coverage of contractors, both absolutely and as percentage of deaths.

In conclusion, Avant argues that their evidences suggests that people see the connection between citizenship and military service differently between soldier and private soldiers. How or whether this translates into sensitivity to casualties, though, is not clear. For now, the most certain thing we can say is that because the use of PSCs garners less media attention than the use of troops, they may indeed have the potential to reduce the political costs of using force – not because most people care less about private soldiers' deaths, but because people know less about them.

Lindsay Cohn (discussant):

Cohn noted that one of the interesting things brought up during the panel is the problem of balancing military and civilian casualties. When you emphasize force protection, you often sacrifice precision. Lowering both is attractive but very hard to do. It begs the moral question: how much risk should you take if you are willing to kill? She also asked the panel what it means to have a fighting force that thinks casualties won't be taken and are not willing to take risks? Does it effect manpower requirements? She cited a study that found that for every casualty taken by the U.S., force strength requirements went up by about 8.3 soldiers. Every time you take a casualty, the planners decide they need almost 10 more people to make up for the fact that they are loosing people. Is it possible that with improved technology, the military may begin to believe that they do not need as many people in the military? This may be why some countries choosen to cut the military budget or downsize. What we heard from the panel is that this may not be a good thing and may not be effective. Technology is only effective if you have people that can use it. She asked the panelists to respond to the fact that the desire to reduce casualties has led to larger budgets but not necessarily more training, leading to a greater reliance on private military contractors—which may backfire if journalists begin to cover their deaths like they cover soldiers deaths, all based on false expectations that combat will get easier and that recruiting and retention will get easier. She also asked Deborah Avant to comment on the effects on military recruitment on the competition between contractors and soldiers.

Answers:

- Avant: Iraq was unique situation because the war was over and then it wasn't. This created a demand that far outstripped the militaries ability to provide manpower. Contractors were able to recruit internationally and this helped meet the manpower demands. Retention is complicated because when people are deciding to reenlist they can decide to sell their skill for a higher price. The American military is struggling with this.
- Biddle: The idea of immaculate warfare with low civilian and military casualties hit its first peak in Kosovo. The stakes were low so the society would only tolerate low costs. Its possible that in September 11th made this conception of warfare obsolete because the stakes are much higher. In the 90s, we engaged in wars of choice but now you could argue that these are existential wars. This is interesting because they way we fought in Afghanistan was very close to the way we fought in Kosovo despite the fact that stakes were much higher.
- Crane: As far as recruitment and casualties are concerned, the military recruiters realized that you don't convince young people, you have to convince the mothers to let them serve. This is why we see the Army moving from "Be all you can Be" that focused on the opportunities for young people in the army to a campaign that focuses on convincing their moms that this is the right thing to do.

Question/Answers and Comments:

- Q1: Proffessor Kohn comments that casualty aversion is not a new phenomena. US culture has been casualty sensitive for a very long time. Grant worried about public response to casualties in the Civil War and leaders worried about this between the world wars. American thinking in the 20s and 30s was very concerned with casualties mainly because of the tactics of the Prussians. He suggests that Avant think about images and words that are connected to contractors/soldiers: Contractor resonates with mercenary; Soldier resonates with citizen soldier. He also thinks it might be interesting to see if the public's response to casualties is dependent on the role they believe different soldiers play in the war. Perhaps they react differently to marine casualties than army casualties because they associate them with different missions and cultures. He also notes that the public has iconized military service --- they think about soldiers as citizens not volunteers

Q.2 : ? Ask Proffessor Avant: Security contractors are armed but many are logistic support that are not armed (feeding, driving, ect). They are not security. It may be misleading to use the term security in connection with contractors.
- Avant: In the experiments, we wanted people to think about security with regard to the contractors, not think they were building houses. Military incorporated more logistics support and have taken the jobs that used to be jobs of the military—you also have military protecting KBR convoys but the reverse is also true. The difference between the military and these contractors may not be that great.

Q3: Is casualty aversion a myth?

- Lindsay Cohn: the idea that public will take casualties if they are dying for a good reason has been prevalent in the military for a long time. The question is when do we consider casualties: before or after articulation of the goal. Do we say we'll except X number of casualties, what goals is it possible to achieve or do we say this is what we want to accomplish how can we do it and limit the number of casualties.

Q4: (Patrick Gaugen) There are two possible hypothesis for the increase in private contractors which are not necessarily exclusive. First, replacing public shooters with private shooters because the political costs of public shooters dying are higher; Second, that replacing public tail with private tail. If it is the second, it seems that logic of using contractors is not casualties but rather reorganizing the force structure more economically.
- Avant: Its neither. The pace of globalization, decreased forces, wrong forces, and increasing needs in the 90 have led to an increase in the use of private contractors. You need people to do all these things. Decisions were made based on our force requirements at the time without a consideration for what we needed in the future. Implications are different than what causes this phenomena.
- Biddle: This is part of a larger trend. Its a transnational phenomena, not just US (its not driven by Rumsfeld or US politics) and the causes are different for different countries.

Q5: (Weinburger) Did 9/11 really change the way we view casualties? If we sent in more ground troops in Afghanistan and there had been substantial casualties, would the reaction in the country have been closer to reaction in WWII than their reaction to casualties in Iraq?
- Biddle: Our ability to topple the Taliban in Afghanistan fairly easily may have raised American expectations even hard. The counterfactual is hard because NATO would support us but maybe not give us lots of ground troops. The urgency to react immediately to prevent second attack before response, delayed us from working more closely with NATO. Getting ground forces would have taken much longer especially because of the complexity of logistics in the Afghanistan theater.

Q6: (?) One of the primary costs of casualties is hatred in the rest of the world. If the U.S. wages war at an arms length and always seems immune, won't this just fuel hatred? There is a sense that the casualties that the US is willing to endure is very different from the number of Muslims the will kill or let die. It seems that 2,000 soldiers pales in comparison to the 1 million babies that died under sanctions and 2 million muslims that have died since Kosovo. That comparison is perilous for us. With regard to civilian contractors, fighting decadent chivalrous wars we can fight at low costs, part of that has been divesting our commitment to the citizen soldier. Long before 9/11 we established contractor bases. We created a notion of an occupying force in a sneaky way. We had control over the region, it was just not overt. How can we address our view of American casualties without addressing theirs, when their view is far more consequential?

- Biddle: Both are consequential. Anti-Americanism is over-determined in this case. Because of our power in world, regardless of our unwillingness to sacrifice our men, we will be hated. Its plausible that our own casualty sensitivity to casualty exacerbates anti-Americanism, but this is hard to parse out empirically
- Crane: It's a problem because we know what Americans will kill for but not what they will die for.
- Avant: Anti-Americanism is not a function of this administration. This mass privatization effort began in the late 1970s. Contracting might be a better way of getting citizens from more nations, more involved. This may suggest to other countries that Americans are willing to contract out their job to our people—they will sacrifice our people but not themselves.

Q7: What are the other independent factors we need to look at? How important are casualties to our allies? How much is being spent do deal with casualties compared to achieving the mission's goals? Are the abuses at Abu Graib worse for the military than increasing casualty rates? Other questions of who is on board, how to win, etc. These question are probably more important than casualties.

Q8. (Bill) When measuring reaction to American dead, you may want to look at partisanship.
- Avant: We did look at partisanship and it had not effect.

Q9. (Ben Valentino)The question of casualty aversion goes beyond the case of Iraq. We constantly hear from our adversaries that all you have to do is kill some Americans to send them home. However, they are not very good at killing us. Why was it so hard for the republican guard to achieve their goal?
- Biddle: What determines force employment is a great question. Civil Military Relations may be an important independent variable. It could be that they are not skilled. Many of the elite guard were given only one chance to practice firing a gun. Whole divisions in the army had never had practice actually firing weapons, or in urban warfare. Why is this so? Every urban area has a palace that shows the locals who is in charge. Saddam is moving around constantly and he didn't trust giving the military the skills to possibly challenge him by giving them practice in urban warfare or firearms. The tactical needs to suppress coups are different than what makes a military successful at interstate wars.

Q10. (Sarah Lischer) Suggest that Avant look beyond mass public opinion compared to the more active or the more involved public, maybe even the networks of antiwar protestors.
- Avant: Although we did not compare the general public to the informed public, we did compare the general public to the local public and found that the general national level sentiment was that they are doing this all for money. It was slightly more sympathetic at the local level.

Q11. (Colin Kahl) Do you draw the force protection concern to stark? There are many examples where the U.S. servicemen are risking their lives. Helicopters have to come in range of RPGS in order to attack enemy, and this is why we have lost so many helicopters.
- Crane: We build massive bases, do our jobs, and then go back to our bases. Although we are taking more risks, we need to be more sensitive to the messages we send with our choice of tactics.

Q12. (Alan Kupperman) Is it immoral to kill or immoral to die? Americans don't see the problem. They think it would be great if we could win without having any of us die, but we hold our enemies to a different standard. We had no problem with Milosevic attacking rebels, our problem was him doing it in a standoff way that leads to civilian casualties or going into the crowd and risking his own casualties. He was applying the logic that most of us agree with. Does the military understand this type of hypocrisy? Is this just the fundamental attribution error?
- Crane: Moral problems are hard. But the army is being taught about these moral problems and trying to incorporate them into its training programs. Are other elite Americans that end up making the decisions also thinking about these issues?

Panel IV: Public Opinion and Casualties
Gelpi:
      Gelpi presents information on whether the public is willing to pay the human costs of war. The question driving this research is: can the American public do what they need to be good citizens and guide policy makers with regard to the use of military force. In order to be able to do this, the public needs to have real attitudes, base their attitudes on reasoned judgments, and have their attitudes shape their behavior. Initially, it was thought that these conditions did not hold, but after the Vietnam War the conventional wisdom changed. Our experience in Vietnam showed that the public could respond reasonably to foreign policy events. The question then focused on how the public responded to casualties and whether this response was reflexive or reflective reaction to the use of force or are they more thinking and calculating.
      John Mueller set the agenda when he argued that public support for wars declined as a function of the log of casualties. Support drops quickly at the beginning and then more slowly as the war goes on. This was the basis for the casualty phobia hypothesis of the public reacting reflexively to increased casualties. This hypothesis was refined in subsequent years to frame the U.S. response to casualties as a cost benefit analysis. Bruce Jentleson argued that casualty sensitivity depended on the type of policy goal the U.S. was pursing: foreign policy restraint, internal political change, or humanitarian issues. Eric Larson argued that the level of elite consensus was the primary factor influencing war support. Kull claims that international consensus was the most important factor. Peter Feaver, Chris Gelpi, and Jason Riefler argue that they key variable is the U.S. prospects for success. The debate has been over how these calculations has been made.

The first question I want to look at is whether the public always responds in the same way or are they undertaking this cost benefit analysis. They look at the three phases of the Iraq war: major combat, insurgency, and post sovereignty. They found that casualties don't have the same effect during all of these phases. During major combat there is a positive relationship between casualties and public opinion, probably due to a rallying effect. During the insurgency, there was a strong inverse relationship between public opinion and casualties except immediately following the capture of Saddam Hussein. In the post-sovereignty phase there was hardly any relationship between the two. Statistically, tests support these trends even after other events are controlled for. This suggests that the U.S. public does not respond reflexively to casualties. Rather how the public responds to casualties depends on the context.

Gelpi argues that how people respond to casualties depends on the intersection of two attitudes: a prospective attitude that judges whether the operation will succeed, and a retrospective attitude that gauges whether the attack was justified. If you put those into a two by two table, you get four attitude clusters: The Vietnam Syndrom—people who think the war was unjustified and that the operation won't succeed; the Bush Base—people who think the war was justified and that the operation will succeed; the Noble Failure: people who think the war was justified but that the operation will not succeed; and the Pottery Barn: people who think the war was unjustified but think that we will succeed.

The most informative cases are noble failure and pottery barn groups. Do they emphasize their retrospective or their prospective judgment? In surveys, Gelpi and his colleagues found that when asked if they would support the war even if it resulted in an additional 400 deaths, about 50% of the pottery barn people were willing to continue fighting but only 15% of the noble failure people thought that the U.S. should continue fighting, suggesting people place more emphasis on prospects for success.

They employed the same model to see if predicted vote choice. They found that people in the noble failure voted for Bush but that people in the pottery barn group voted for Kerry, suggesting that within the electoral setting, retrospective judgments about the rightness of the war are more important.

Then Gelpi presented evidence on where these attitudes regarding success and rightness come from. Feaver, Gelpi and Reifler found that when respondents were asked what it means to be successful, their answers reflected Bush's rhetoric on what success would look like. Some of the most popular answers were Iraqis providing their own security, a democratic Iraq, and Iraqis leading normal lives. There was not much focus on terrorism or WMD. The public moved away from that initial definition of success and accepted Bush's definition.

In exploring what influences people's beliefs about whether going into Iraq was the right thing, they found that partisanship played a large role. One troubling finding was that when asked why they supported the operation, large number of people gave responses that lacked empirical evidence such as WMD and al-Qaeda.

Gelpi concludes that their data suggest that the public does organize their beliefs about foreign policy along reasonable dimensions and that they use their beliefs to inform their political behavior. Their reactions are not reflexive; they are reasoned and responsive to events on the ground. Some questions still need to be addressed. We need

to look at the degree to which public opinion can be led by elite statements. We need to understand how partisan bias influences how people process new information.

Renee Richardson:

Richardson looks at public responses to civilian casualties across western democracies. She conducted surveys of the public and interviewed elites in the United States, Britain, and France. Public opinion seems to matter in coalition warfare. There are two primary hypotheses about the relationship between civilian casualties and public opinion. Ikenburry argues that the public cares about civilians almost as much as their own soldiers. Mueller argues that they do not matter at all.

Richardson is building on the literature that looks at civilian casualties as a cost, the literature that says Americans place less emphasis on mulitlateralism because they are more powerful, and the literature addressing when governments target civilians. In framing civilian casualties in terms of a cost/benefit analysis, we need to consider mission specific benefits as well as different costs, including military casualties, monetary resources, and noncombatant casualties. We also need to look at how contextual factors change the relative weights of different factors. Contextual factors include the legitimacy of the war, the probability of victory, technological expectation, and how the media reports civilian casualties.

Richardson designed a survey experiment to explore how the public responds to civilian casualties in different contexts. She compared different goals: defending allies, WMD, ethnic cleansing, and humanitarian missions. The French are as willing to use force as the U.S. and U.K but they support the use of force in different scenarios. She found that France was most willing to support interventions for humanitarian missions and ethnic cleansing. The U.S. and the U.K. is most willing to support the use of force to defend its allies.

With regard to balancing military and civilian casualties, the French public tended to think protecting civilians is more important than protecting their military, while the U.S. and France were their attitudes were more balanced. In questions that explicitly addressed questions about a tradeoff between the two, everyone was more protective of their military. In France, many more people declined to answer.

Richardson also varied the target involved in different questions, asking about civilian casualties that had died as a result of bombing a mosque or bombing a command and control bunker. She also varied the country conducting the bombing. In all cases, the public did discriminate between hitting a military target and a mosque. Compared to other countries, more people in the U.S. thought their military was not at fault even when a mosque had been bombed. The same general pattern existed in Britain, although they do not have as much faith in the military more generally. When asked to assess other countries' past performance on avoiding civilian casualties, the U.K. and France do not think the U.S. is very effective.

In her interviews, Richardson found that elites believed many of the differences between countries was a result of differing colonial legacies. People in both Britain and Frace thought that one of the reasons the U.S. was not successful in avoiding civilian casualties was because the U.S. did not have a colonial history. In addition, elites in all three countries perceived their publics as more casualty averse than survey data suggests. In Europe, and especially France, there seems to be great regret for not intervening in Rwanda which may account for them being more interventionist. Finally, in France

leaders place more emphasis on the fact that the military consists of volunteers who chose to join the military and understood that they were risking death to do so.

Bill Boetcher and Mike Cobb:

Boetcher looks at how the public contextualizes casualties. He notes that in the spring of 2004, the Bush administration began to report enemy body counts and casualty ratio data instead of just U.S. casualty figures. Why were they doing this? By reporting both sets of numbers, U.S. casualties can be put in context. They tested to see if reporting casualty counts versus casualty ration data changed how the public responded to casualties. He found that reporting the casualty ratio decreases the impact of casualty sensitivity.

Some of the problems with the public opinion data is problematic because it is aggregate, cumulative, monotonic, and univariate. There may be a difference in post cold war, post September 11th era. They want to look at the likelihood that the public does do something like a cost benefit analysis.

In order to explore how context effects casualty sensitivity, he conducted a survey experiment where respondents would read different media stories and then answer a series of questions. Each frame was a fake story from the New York times. Some stories just reported absolute casualty numbers, while others reported casualty rations. The number of Americans killed and the ratios were varied. In addition, stories differed on whether they referred to enemy as insurgents or terrorists.

After the experiment, respondents were asked to estimate the number of U.S. deaths in Iraq. The mean and the mode were way off, but the median was close to the actual number. There were only 15% of people were within 20% of the actual number. This challenges the rationalist assumption that the public actually knows how many casualties there are. Respondents were also asked what the acceptable level of deaths. The mean was close to 57,000 but was probably driven by outliers. The median was 500 and the mode was 0. Twenty-four percent of people refused to answer. As far as determinants of support, they found that partisanship, gender, and race all mattered as did the log of acceptable casualties minus the log of the estimate. In general they found that casualty tolerance mattered only at the margins and was not really driving opinions. They did find that when respondents were asked whether a given battle was a success, only 30% of the respondents who got the casualty count thought it was successful where 64% of respondents who got the ratio thought it was successful.

Cobb discusses their Pew experiments. They found that the most important thing we found was that who you voted for changed how you interpreted stories. For Kerry voters, stories of high U.S. casualties hurt support for the war and stories where the ratio was reported had no effect on support for the war. For Bush supporters, stories with casualties had not effect while stories that reported the ratio actually increased war support. Party ID is the most important mediating factor in how people respond to casualties.

They argue that the pattern of public opinion in the Iraq war poses a major question of why war support has declined so quickly. They argue that it can't be the cumulative number of casualties because people don't know the cumulative number. Its possible that it could be marginal casualties, but they found no support for that hypothesis. Finally, it could be the rate of news coverage of casualties. People read

stories about casualties and although they do not know the specific numbers they have feel for how many people are dying relative to other time periods. These news stories could also be places where opponents criticize the war.

They criticize the cost/benefit approach that Gelpi used in his analysis. They argue that most people are not in the pottery barn or noble failure groups. Public opinion is more polarized. Most people fall into the Vietnam Syndrome and Bush base groups. These decisions are highly correlated with each other. There is not a lot of variance. They claim all answers depend on partisanship. If you voted for Bush you believe that it was the right thing and we will win. The people who voted for Kerry are a little more heterogeneous but most think it was wrong and that we will not win. They also argue that the Feaver/Gelpi/Reifler analysis ignores the endogeneity problem: Do people vote for Bush because they believe that it was right to invade Iraq or do they believe it was right to invade Iraq because they support Bush? We don't know which way the causal arrow goes. Stronger beliefs are harder to change. So if you have a strong belief about Bush its likely to drive your other beliefs.

In addition, they claim that it might be better to use short term success in the analysis rather than long term success because it works just as well but its easier to measure and it might be easier for the public to make short term calculations instead of long term calculations.

They argue that the drop in support ca not be due to elite polarization because there are so few anti-war democrats. The mass public is out in front of democratic elites. The public is more polarized than they have ever been, even more so than the Vietnam War, but we do not get democratic elites criticizing the war. There is big split in whether the war was right or wrong, whether we will succeed or not, but there is not a split in the withdrawal question. This is consistent with the polarization argument because you see politicians discussing whether the deiciosn was wrong or right not debating whether we should withdrawl is consistent with that argument. The answer is Bush. Everything driving support for the war are people's opinions about Bush.

Kristin Thompson Sharp (discussant)

Sharp begins by noting how its interesting to think of both how public opinion shapes foreign policy but also what the determinants of public opinion are. She commended Renee Richardson for looking across countries and not just at the United States but wondered if the hypothetical situations presented in the survey might be conflated with the current war in Iraq and how the different countries are involved. She asked if Renee was planning on extending her survey to other countries.

She suggests to Boetcher and Cobb that having the New York Times as your frame may influence respondents. Whether the news comes from New York Times or Fox might change the willingness of different respondents to accept the message. She noted that their study of elite perception of public opinion, elite opinion, and mass opinion was interesting and thought it was interesting to see whether elites were leading mass opinion or mass opinion was leading elite opinion. She also thought it might be useful for Boetcher and Cobb to compare the effects of partisanship compared to ideology.

Answers:

- Gelpi: Disagreed with Cobb and Boetcher that there are not pottery barn people. Two thirds to three fourths of the people are at the extremes but there is still a significant portion of the public that is either in the pottery barn or noble failure camp. He notes that belief in success and belief in the rightness of the mission are correlated and that there is an endogeneity problem because both attitudes are likely to be a function of party ID. However, their analysis suggested that there was an effect of both variables beyond party id. It influences beliefs about rightness more than beliefs about success.
- Cobb: Its possible that the time the survey's were conducted explains the difference in data since Gelpi's data was collected earlier. In addition, he thinks that vote choice is more important than party id because of independents.
- Richardson: She is going to use data from other wars to see if her findings are consistent but you can't get away from the fact that the Iraq war is going on. She also noted that her findings are probably interested in the fact that there was a UK election going on when the survey was administered.
- Cobb: Its difficult to tell if the source of a news story (the New York Times) invokes trust or mistrust. It could also be the case that some networks, such as Fox, are more likely to report ratios instead of straight casualty figures.

Question and Answer
Q1: Is casualty sensitivity an outcome or a cause of polarization? Casualty sensitivity could be a result of the polarization of the American public that we have seen sense 2000.
- Feaver: In the 90's the impact of casualties was flipped. Republicans were more sensitive to casualties while Democrats were more acceptant.
- Boetcher: Looked at humanitarian interventions. Republican evangelicals more likely to support casualties in Sudan. There was convergences between men and women.

Q2: (Feaver) Is the ratio a more or less valid depiction of the battle? Why are short term assessments more meaningful than long term? It may not be obvious to the public who is winning or loosing in the short run? You said the public is out in front of the elites, what do you mean by that?
- Cobb: The cognitive limitations of making end state projections make long term assessments more difficult than judging where we are now. They are correlated at the .6 level, suggesting they are similar but distinct. He notes that the democratic public is more antiwar than democratic leaders. With regard to the public being out in front of elites, the democratic base is more critical of the war than democratic elites.
- Boetcher: Not sure whether body counts or ratios are more valid, we were not concerned with which was more valid, we were only looking at how it changes public perceptions.

Q3: (Avant) Gelpi, why do you use general support for bush instead of support for the war? Richardson, how does your theory connect with the data? Cobb, the execution of

the war has been a question of debate and that debate seems more reasonable than a debate of war versus antiwar,

- Gelpi: We use support for the president because questions use identical wording asked regularly, for overlapping times. Support for bush and support for handling of war is correlated at .85-.9. We also control for changes in economy.
- Renee: It is hard to test whole theory at once. I'm trying to test little pieces of the theory. The reasoning behind this part of the study was the Pew finding that the majority of world thinks the U.S. does not try hard enough to minimize casualties.
- Cobb: He is not saying that it would be more reasonable to have an anti-war war debate rather than a debate over how the war is conducted. He is more interested in looking at the effects of polarization. The fact that the public is polarized over whether the war was right and whether the war was conducted effectively but not over whether we should withdrawal tracks well with elite discourse.

Q4: (Cory) Renee, could you talk about how media frames influences casualty aversion in different countries.

Renee: I would hypothesis that the media frame influences changing perceptions of the war. It is not a major part of my theory but it may play a role.

Q5: (Alex to Renee) Do you think the US public cares about civilian casualties and how does that relate to other countries? What is the effect of Party ID?

- Renee: Civilian casualties do matter and the tradeoff question is the empirical support for this. Because all three countries were more willing to support aggressive action with the loss of non combatants compared to combatants. Haven't run the numbers on party id yet.

Q6: (? For Cobb) In your analysis over 60% report voting for bush—does this mean that there is selection bias? The Lemont Leiberman race in Conneticut will be interesting to watch.

- Cobb : It may be that non bush voters didn't answer some questions and so got dropped from the analysis. Pew was not an outlier in regard to predicting vote choice. The question then becomes, why do non-bush voters not answer as many questions?

Q7: (Kohn) Do you get the same answers over time to the same questions?

- Feaver: The instability of public opinion is important to focus on dynamics, not what is the answer right now. We would expect attitudes to relate to context. If they didn't that would be problematic. Replication in different contexts helps give us confidence in the results.
- Gelpi: This is also why just looking at percentages is not as informative as looking at correlations. It is important to look at multiple surveys in multiple scenarios to ensure that your results are robust.

Q8: (Arkin) We looked at whether there was a correlation between what is reported and presidential approval? Every story that NBC did, made public opinion go up. Presidential support never declined, even if stories were negative. Only declined when something else was in the news and the war was not covered.

Q9: (Paul to Gelpi) How do you deal with the relative lack of knowledge among the public?
- Gelpi: Want to see more data and look beyond college students. Kull did an analysis of public opinion where he found that the median estimate for casualties was always pretty close.
- Cobb: The data I refer to was a Pew survey, not just college students. As for using college students, they are informative in looking at the way people process information about the war.

Q10: (Peter on media panel?) Elite polarization needs to be covered by the media, and the absence of democratic disensus is a function of the media who have argued that antiwar stance is not smart politically. One reason why we see such a party dimension on the war, the republican party has remained behind Bush. In Kosovo, congressmen from his own party criticized Clinton.

Q11: (?) Why won't the UK pass judgments on France but are willing to judge the U.S. despite the fact that the U.S. and U.K are close diplomatically.
- Renee: It may be because France just hasn't been involved in that many military interventions.

Panel IV: Measuring Civilian Casualties
Richard Garfield:
Most of the information on mortality is collected by ministries of health, which rely on passive records of deaths. What Garfield focuses on today are more active efforts to record fatalities.
Compared to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the 2003 war—with a more robust military mission—ended up with only a doubling of combat casualties among allied forces and a small increase in civilian casualties during major combat operations. We do not know the exact number, but we are fairly certain they are in the right range because they rely on counts of morgues and cemeteries. To a large extent, efforts to reduce civilian casualties in periods of major combats have been vindicated when that is the major goal of the mission.
The number of interstate wars have declined since the end of the cold war but most wars after the cold war are civil wars. Iraq is very unique. The number of combat casualties has likewise declined since the Korean War, especially in the last five years. In fact, in the last five years, we have had fewer casualties then at any time in the last 200 years. This doesn't seem to have gotten out to the public who believe there are lots of wars and lots of people are dying in these wars.
Another way to think about casualties is to put them in perspective compared to other causes of deaths. In 1998 most people died from vehicle accidents, then suicide,

then homicide, then war. This was the same for developed and developing countries. There is big difference between car accidents and suicide and between homicide and war.

The number of military casualties usually parallels the number of civilian casualties during combat operations but in the past very few people have died during occupations. Iraq is an anomaly in that sense.

Collecting this data is difficult. Even trying to collect information on the mortality rates of children during the sanctions was difficult. Sample data confirmed conventional wisdom that mortality was low before the sanction and rose after the sanctions. However, census data showed that mortality was high prior to the sanctions and that there was not a rapid rise during the sanctions. Its hard to tell which studies were better and which pattern is more accurate. A later UNDP study found that people were reluctant to say if their children had died. They found that when people were pressured, the number of reported child deaths doubled.

Assessing mortality rates is not simple, unless you are in the Pentagon because keeping track of combatant fatalities is easy due to the fact that you have a list. Data sets on military deaths are so much better than data sets on civilian deaths.

Garfield then discusses the Lancet survey of Iraqi civilian deaths compared to Iraq Body Count. The Lancet visited 988 households comparing fourteen months prior and 17 months after the invasion comparing mortality across all causes. The impact of the invasion varied by region. In the North, mortality rates did not go up but they did rise in the rest of the country, especially in regions where there was lots of conflict.

Iraq Body Count found similar patterns. Iraq Body Count uses press reports that are verified and government information from Iraq. Because it merely adds up deaths, it is incomplete. Its much better to take a sample and extrapolate to the larger population. Like Iraq Body Count, most estimates undercount the deaths of noncombatants. It would be better to look at small samples and extrapolate.

Garfield and his colleagues found that there was a major rise in violence after war but deaths from infectious disease and accidents have also risen. This may suggest that living conditions are access to modern health services had deteriorated. However, chronic disease is still the major cause of death.

There are many different sources of civilian deaths in Iraq. Most just look at war related deaths. If you just look at the press and the morgue you get a similar number of deaths per day as the health ministry estimates. Iraq Body Count data is in that range. The low level of capture of the UNDP study found a rate that is double and the Lancet survey found a much higher rate but we looked at all causes not just violent causes of death. All of these surveys are good efforts, but they all undercount the number of deaths. It is good to keep in mind that most wars are not like Iraq. Most occur in poorer countries. In most conflicts there are not surveys. We need more surveys like ours.

Beth Daponte

Daponte argues that impressions and political ideology affect how we count civilian deaths in addition to how we interpret those numbers. The rule of proportionality calls for us to make both prospective and retrospective estimates of civilian casualties but demographers have usually not been involved in these projects.

She explains that the most effective way to study this problem is too look at excess deaths by subtracting average deaths for a country from the total number of deaths

during the war. In her analysis she found 5 categories of excess mortality: members of the military who died during war, civilian deaths during war by direct effects, civilian deaths from war induced health effects, civilian deaths in postwar violence, and military deaths in postwar violence.

You have to base your calculations not on absolute numbers but rather on counterfactuals: what would the population have looked like if there had not been a war. In the 1991 war, an estimated 3,500 civilians died from direct violence and over 100,000 died from indirect violence. But it was hard to disentangle effects of war from other effects, such as the sanctions.

The problem with measuring civilian casualties in Iraq is determining how we define the war? Is it just military violence or should sanctions be included? When does the war begin and end—we have March 2003 till when?

There is also problem from disentangling causes of deaths. When counting, are we looking at whether the U.S. should be accountable for these deaths or whether the deaths can be attributed to U.S. action? For example, should the U.S. be accountable for deaths during looting.

There are a number of ways to estimate casualties. Tallies are problematic because you risk over counting because double counting is likely. You risk undercounting because really the number you arrive at is a minimum. Its also possible to miscount by misconstruing the place, the cause of death, etc. Its much better to run surveys and extrapolate to the entire population. Although, defining the parameters of the population is difficult. Should we include Kurdish areas in the population? The accuracy of these estimates depends on the size of the sample, the standard error, reliability and validity of the survey instrument, the biases of the sample, how you weight the responses, and the truth of the survey responses. Excess military deaths are usually a tally. Excess civilian deaths can either be a tally or a survey.

The costs of making these estimates are very high. You need reliable estimates prior to the war and after the war. We stat out with the population in five year age groups and we age that population over the time of the war. How they age depend on what you assume to be the fertility rates, the number of women in the population, and the average child mortality.

You also have to deal with uncertainty. One way of coping with this problem is to rely on Bayesian logic that looks at the probability distribution of the demographic factors that you are interested in over a given range. This is beneficial because point estimates leave you more certain than you should be, while a distribution takes into account uncertainty. Another way to account for uncertainty is report a high, medium, and low number. But it is hard for readers to analyze this data because it is not clear which number is the most likely. It is also hard to get a baseline for comparison.

War compounds these problems. First, it creates a problem of selection bias because most countries that are war prone have weak vital registration systems. Data collection is usually a low priority during war and you often get different answers to survey questions when the population is under stress.

Dapont then commented on the different surveys used in Iraq now. She notes that the UNDP, Iraq Living Conditions Survey looks at war related deaths and includes people who have died because of the war or are missing, but missing people cannot be necessarily attributed to the war. They also cannot attribute deaths to any specific cause.

She argues that Iraq Body Count is a minimum and the Lancet is a very small sample with a huge confidence interval. She argues that the actual numbers of the different surveys vary, but conclusions about trends are similar. We may not need an actual number.

She concludes by summarizing the challenges confronting the estimation of casualties. First, how we define the war influences our results. Second, it is difficult to determine the cause of death. Third, it is hard to determine if your estimating base is representative. Fourth, you have to consider the counterfactual. Fifth, it all is contingent on high quality data which is often not available during wars.

Bill Arkin

Arkin argues that there is a need for a holistic study on the impact of warfare. Demographic changes are only one important part of the picture. It also necessitates the involvement of the military.

In 1991, the Iraqis believed that the plight of the Iraqi people would convince the international community to lift sanctions. The leaders believed this so they allowed the international community to come in and gave us extraordinary access. The U.S. government gave theme maps, target lists with the theory that Arkin's study would help military understand what happened during the war. The Iraqis assumed that I worked for CIA. These maps just fascinated the Iraqis. There were Generals who had literally never seen maps of their own country. This began a decade or more of a study of war. Since then, Arkin has participated in five different surveys in Iraq, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Chechnya, and the UN survey of Lebanon. He has seen lots of bomb targets and talked to many people on the ground. He believes that we really need to explore whether we adequately measure the impact of war.

He argues that people employ numbers in an inadvertent and purposeful ways. A number of speakers remarked that casualties are low in Iraq but what is that in comparison to: Vietnam, World War II, Kosovo? We need to compare casualties to the total number of enemy troops and the total number of forced employed in any one area. In Vietnam, the U.S. force was five times as large and the enemy forces were close to 100 times larger than they are in Iraq. When this is taken into consideration, more soldiers are dying today in Iraq given the force structure and the numbers of the enemy.

We also need to consider what the mission is. Richard argued that the number of casualties only doubled from the 91 war to the 2003 war, despite a far more expansive mission. But at the same time, there are far fewer U.S. forces in contact with the enemy in the 2003 war than in the 1991 war. There were two and a half Iraqi divisions in 2003 and 43 Iraqi divisions in 1991 and we suffered twice as many casualties in half the time. The numbers are important because they effect the conclusions we draw.

Arkin then looks at how civilian casualties should be interpreted in this broader context. Its really hard to get these numbers. In Kosovo, they have him all the autopsy reports. This enabled him to make very accurate predictions. We were able to track civilian deaths in the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo campaign, because the governments kept records and gave them too us. He went and verified this on the ground but you can't begin to verify if you do not have records. It is impossible when we don't have records, as in Afghanistan and the 2003 Iraq War. We need to make governments see collecting and distributing this information as a function of governance and both

parties need to participate. Civilian casualties are difficult to measures because we do not know how many killed are killed by the U.S. and coalition forces or by insurgents. We also do not know how many are killed lawfully and unlawfully?

Arkin also noted that it is not brilliance that makes us able to do effects based operations, its technology and the way the entire society organizes itself. We need to think about who we are fighting and how they organize themselves. What is the similarity between Iraq and Yugoslavia as our enemeies. They are high centralized governments and capital intensive militaries. They were the perfect enemies. We had things to hit. They lacked innovation and could not react to us. Militia based, decentralized, non capital intensive opponent is much harder to fight. That is the type of enemy we are fighting today. Who we fight changes how we can interpret the numbers. We look at our ability to fight Iran or North Korea by comparing our weapons systems. The 2003 Iraq War proved that this does not matter. The more important question is how do we employ our forces and how does the enemy employ their forces.

Arkin commented that he is sad that the military looks at the issue of civilian casualties as a problem of damage control and perception management. It is more than that. It is an intrinsic issue on the efficacy of warfare. The exception is a small pocket of people in the Air Force, who are doing it because the level of perfection asked of them during the Kosovo operation was frustrating. They understand how it fits into the broader picture.

Everyone should fight the way Americans do but they do not. Russians do what Russians do. The question is: why does everyone think that we do limit civilian deaths effectively? In 2003 we dropped 6,000 weapons in Baghdad killing 2,250 people. In 1991 dropped less than 450 bombs. Why is this different? Because after the Amariya shelter, we limited bombing. If the US wanted to kill people we could. Why doesn't the world recognize this?

Downes (Discussant)

Downes commented that the survey and tally estimates are pretty close, particularly the IBC and UNDP Surveys. Is that because all are equally bad? He asks that when comparing the Lancet versus UNDP 2004 study, why we should have more confidence in the Lancet survey when UNDP had a larger sample? What were the flaws in the UNDP study? He also asked panelist to comment on whether increased compliance with the laws of war actually decreases civilian casualties. Is better technology problematic in the sense that having this technology makes countries less careful about the indirect effects of bombing, such as turning the water and the electricity off? Can indirect deaths be attributed to anyone?

- Daponte: In trying to attribute deaths to any cause, we look at who died. Does it look like a random sample of the population--do age and sex attributes parallel percentages in the general population? Is there a higher concentration of war aged men then usual? Deciding who is responsible for the deaths is much more difficult, especially without detailed records. It is difficult to gauge whether we have decreased civilian casualties. In 1991 and in Kosovo we were able to limit direct effects of bombs, but limiting indirect effects is hard to gauge.
- Arkin: The key question is does precision result in fewer casualties? There is little incompatibility between law of war compliance and humanitarian

protection. It all depends on the efficiency of the military institution. But civilians die from systemic breakdown because preserving the distinction between civilian and military targets is very important. We learned about the indirect effects of bombing from the 1991 war. Civilians today are more vulnerable because they are more dependent on modern infrastructure. Looking at the consequences of effects based operations is difficult because of dual use targets. If coercion becomes the dominant way of war, we will make civilians more vulnerable especially as dual use infrastructure and military infrastructure blurs. This will only become more problematic as our reliance on technology increases. Take for example the targeting of communication facilities. In the future our communication facilities will run our electricity and our utilities, so targeting military communication facilities that both the civilian sector and the military sector use could be disastrous. We flirt with humanitarian disaster as we blur distinction between civilian and military infrastructure.

- Garfield: The impact of technology depends on what we target with precision weapons. If the interest is in spin, the indirect effects can be avoided. If the goal is to alleviate the suffering of civilian casualties. We need to look hard at what is happening. Attribution is layered. What is the immediate cause of death—what was the dehydration? What is the underlying cause of death—deteriorating water systems? And what is the systemic cause of death—who caused the deterioration of the water system? The problem is that everyone denies responsibility.

Question and Answer:

Q1. (Feaver) People base their projections on the counterfactual that there are no benefits to war. You use as a baseline that things won't get worse if we don't go to war, but there is another counterfactual that we go to war to avoid a worse situation: nuclear weapons, tyranny, etc. The moral case is a claim that the counterfactual will be worse than the war case. Does this limit our ability to study this in a systematic way? We are better at measuring the costs but hard to come to an ethical conclusion on how to use those numbers?

- Arkin: We need to include an estimate about how many people Saddam Hussein would have killed. This might let us do a cost benefit analysis. We need a more methods based study or we will reach the wrong conclusion. The 1991 Persian Gulf War was perfect but Saddam stayed in power. In 1999 the war was imperfect but we got Milosevic. It is worth studying and worth understanding. I
- Daponte: It depends on how you frame the counterfactual: are the benefits of the war for the international community or for the population affected by the war. Excess mortality rates of deaths by Saddam Hussein are built into your baseline projections, the excess mortality to the international community are not.
- Avant: We do have lots of numbers on Rwanda. Could we study this in the way that Feaver is asking about, where war didn't happen?

Q2: (Dauber) Why isn't your work recorded when the New Hampshire study was picked up?

> Arkin: The media isn't an entity. There are lots of actors involved. The media can't be responsible for casualty aversion because casualty aversion is a myth. We need to look at who we are citing. The New Hampshire study was not good. IBC is not good--what is a verified press report? How can you make news reported by the Washington Post and Dawn the same? You are not counting you are conducting politics. IBC is especially suspect since 2004 when the insurgency makes it difficult for journalists to collect data, especially outside of Baghdad. The Media is not the government or the academic community. We need a holistic report that looks at tallies, surveys, records, press stories, and interviews. The question of ascribing intention to numbers is more difficult. The U.S. does not intend to hurt civilians. From 1991 to 2004, no civilian casualties resulted because of deliberate targeting. The only civilian we have targeted is Bin Laden. Incompetence is not the same as intentionality. From 91 to 2004, no casualties resulted because of deliberate targeting except for Osama Bin Laden.

Panel VI: IGO's, NGO's and Casualties

Alan J. Kupperman:

IGOS and NGOs have promoted an emerging norm of humanitarian intervention. There is a belief that if there is genocide or ethnic cleansing, the international community has a responsibility to intervene regardless of the underlying cause. There is a right to be protected. The goal of these efforts is to reduce civilian casualties from warfare or from state violence. But in several prominent cases this norm has backfired, exacerbating violent conflict and resulting in more military and civilian casualties.

Knowledge of this norm encourages rebellions by disgruntled ethnic groups against quite powerful states. Normally these groups would not rebel because they would be deterred by massive state retaliation. The norm increases the chance of a successful rebellion. These groups believe that third parties will protect them from retaliation and help them achieve their political aims. When the rebel group is deciding whether to rebel, they have to expect a third party to intervene and they have to be willing to risk some casualties within their group prior to the expected intervention. Because third parties do intervene in some cases, an expectation of future intervention for other rebel groups prompts them to rebel.

This creates a problem of moral hazard. The intervention regime is like an insurance policy. Groups are protected from risk. This makes them more likely to engage in risk taking behavior or fraudulent behavior. By creating the expectation of intervention, the intervention regime actually leads to additional suffering because it prompts rebel groups to provoke states into retaliating against them, thereby prompting the international community to intervene on behalf of the rebels.

Take Bosnia, Kosovo, and possibly also Darfur as an example. Why did these groups rebel? There are five possible explanations. It could be that the groups did not think that there was going to be retaliation. They could have expected to be victimized whether they rebelled or not, so they opted for rebellion. They thought they could defeat

the state at an acceptable cost. The group expected third party intervention to help them achieve victory at a tolerable cost. Finally, the group was not acting rationally.

In both Bosnia and Kosovo, the leaders of the armed secessions knew that they could not succeed on their own and that their actions would provoke massive state retaliation, so they proceeded only because they expected the state's atrocities to attract humanitarian intervention on their behalf, enabling them to achieve their political goal. This was their plan a year prior to rebellion.

In both cases, the international community and the US did intervene, but not decisively until the group had suffered massive retaliation. In Bosnia, 100,000 Muslims died. In Kosovo, 1 million people were ethnically cleansed.

Kupperman's argument is that the genocidal violence was only in retaliation to the rebellion, and the rebellion was only because of the prospect of humanitarian intervention. Therefore, the emerging norm unintentionally caused, or at least exacerbated, these two instances of genocidal violence. He provided evidence from interviews that he conducted in the Balkans that support this hypothesis.

Kupperman proposes a number of reforms to mitigate the perverse effects of the intervention regime. First, there should not by intervention when rebels provoke retaliation, unless the retaliation is disproportionate or rebels abandon violence and accept state sovereignty. Second, the international community needs to use resources to address the legitimate grievances of non-violent domestic groups. Finally, the international community should provide purely humanitarian aid to civilians in these cases and not military aid to rebel groups.

Kelly Greenhill:

The primary question is Greenhill is concerned with is: Do NGOs and IGOs exacerbate or ameliorate civilian casualties in wartime? Greenhill argues that they do both. They perform very valuable assistance on the ground and help lobby western governments for humanitarian aid, but there are unintended consequences of their work. There are indirect effects of their aid work within the countries they are trying to help, while thier activism in the west creates perverse incentives.

For example, activist pressure leads western governments to adopt restrictive rules of engagement, which leads to a decline in civilian casualties. At the same time, restrictive rules of engagement increase the duration of war and increase civilian casualties.

We need to look at the positive and negative effects of aid on the conflict as well as how it affects the breadth and depth of conflict. Aid may narrow the issues combatants are fight over. It could widen the conflict by create an incentive to fight over aid, leading to spoils driven violence, which can increase civilian casualties. It may also change the depth of the conflict. By promoting transparency and credible commitments it could improve the conditions for ending the conflict. It could also intensify the conflict. Likewise, aid could decrease the length of the conflict or it could increase the length of conflict.

It could also be the case that although violence generally decreases with more NGO involvement as we have seen in the post cold war world. But as Alan discussed, it may be the case that these conflicts would not have happened at all if aid was not an issue.

NGO and IGO activity also create perverse incentives. One of the ways NGOs and IGOS pressure Western Democracies is by leveraging hypocrisy costs, a special kind of reputation cost that arise from gap between an actors claims and their real or perceived actions. NGOS and IGOS pressures the leaders of western democracies to denounce civilian casualties and then use instances of collateral damage to pressure them to reduce casualties further by claiming those countries are not being true to their word. This tactic seems to work and seems to become more effective overtime. The problem is that for these groups, it is not enough for countries to reduce civilian casualties; countries should always be trying to get fewer and fewer civilian casualties. The gate posts are always moving and eventually there is little room for improvement. This is a laudable goal, but it comes with a cost because it hurts countries' ability to prosecute the mission. In the Afghanistan there were at least 10 cases where the military felt they could get high powered al-Qaeda leaders but did not because of concern for civilian casualties.

These norms give power to all sides in a conflict: both the good guys and the bad guys. Weak actors can use the proven track record of stronger (usually liberal states) as an effective method of nonmilitary coercion. In addition, savvy targets will attempt to manipulate attackers, who they think will abide by these rules, by placing targets in civilian areas, using human shields, etc. Technological determinism seems to be driving a normative determinism- fueling demands to move towards bloodless war. This can have significant adverse effects on a military's ability to prosecute wars successfully by restraining targeting, limiting strategic options, and forcing them to let the bad guys get away.

Sarah Lischer:

Lischer looks at humanitarian NGOS, such as CARE, World Vision, and Doctors without Borders, whose primary mission is to provide assistance during wars. They are not human rights NGOS whose primary role is data collection and advocacy. There is wide variation even within this subset with regard to their specific mission. However, this type of NGO holds three primary values: first, neutrality—they do not take sides in a conflict; second, independence—they function independent of government control; and third impartiality—they administer aid just based on need not based on political affiliation or religion, etc.. In addition to the moral importance they attach to these values, adhering to these principals protects them when they are administering aid.

The Rwandan catastrophe generated a debate over whether these values are appropriate in all circumstances. Many of the people receiving aid in the refugee camps were the people who had carried out the genocide. Adhering to the principal of impartiality, they provided all refugees aid. This helped sustain the rebel force on the border, which contributed to conflict breaking out between Rwanda and Zair. In that case, adherence to the primary values actually exacerbated the conflict.

There is also a question of whether adhering to these values actually provides these NGOs with protection. It used to be that the Red Cross emblem protected aid workers from attack. Recently there have been a number of high profile attacks against aid workers. This has all been brought to a head in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Governments see NGOs as deeply involved in politics. For example, in Iraq insurgents see NGOs as de facto allies because they are trying to ensure stability. If the goal is to make the country ungovernable, one way to do that is to terrorize the NGOs. Insurgents

want them to leave but occupiers want them to stay despite the fact these groups are "neutral" and are willing to provide aid to both sides.

These factors have led to two strands of arguments about the core values. The first focuses on the unintended consequences of providing aid in an impartial or neutral way. For example these groups have to negotiate with really bad people to get access to victims, this may inadvertently give those people and their cause legitimacy. The second argument, asserts that these values have become corrupted. There are two paths to corruption. One is that governments have co-opted humanitarian values. Humanitarianism has been debased. The second is that NGOs have willing abandoned their values either because they see value in this (for example getting government funding) or because they do not think they work anymore.

Governments have recognized that humanitarian activity is integral to war. Governments often provide aid during the war. She invokes the U.S. dropping food packets along with bombs in the Afghanistan campaign. NGOs see this as a political stunt that not only interferes with their mission but also undermines the values they attach to their organization. There is a belief by many governments that NGOs are force multipliers and are part of the larger team. NGOs doe not like this, but it is often true that humanitarian aid often helps further the political aims of military interventions. NGOs worry that the difference between the NGO sector and the government sector is blurring. But there is already a blur between the non-governmental and the governmental sector with regard to aid because many NGOS get a large portion of their money from the government.

With this blurring, some have abandoned neutrality. Some, like CARE, have decided not to be neutral because being neutral does not actually protect civilians. Others have advocated for political and military action, for example, in Darfur and Afghanistan. There is variation in their stances. Some want to remain impartial but some want to be more involved. Regardless of their stance, this blurring has caused many NGOS problems as some groups refuse to acknowledge them or their protected status. Many are still attacked and killed even if they claim they are neutral.

Lischer suggests some possible policy options for dealing with this problem. First, it would benefit western NGOS to partner with Muslim NGOS which may have more credibility in the Middle East. NGOS could hire private security or work openly with occupation forces. Alternatively, they could withdrawal from conflicts.

Camber Warren (discussant)

There are some over arching themes addressed by this panel, most focusing on neutrality and unintended consequences. With regard to neutrality, it may not be just an image failure. Neutrality may be impossible during war. If you save lives of one group when they other group is trying to kill those people, you are hurting the military goals of the first group. Even by abstaining from action, you may be siding with one group. The more difficult question is how do you balance the need for neutrality with other goals and if you have to choose sides, how do you do that?

It is very difficult to determine the unintended consequences because drawing the proper counterfactuals is not straight forward. Take Somalia as an example, would it have been better or worse if we had never gotten involved? We see insurgents rebelling

all the time despite the fact they rarely succeed. Many studies have shown that rebels are often irrationally optimistic about their prospects for success.

Warren also notes that the moral hazard analogy may not be that robust. Insurgents rebel all the time without any chance of success and third parties do not intervene very often. If out of 100 civil wars there are only 5 or 6 interventions, this is not a very good insurance policy.

Warren also suggests three ways for panelists to improve their arguments. First, look at conditions under which different patterns of unintended consequences emerge. Does regime type matter, the type of conflict, the style of the intervention, or the amount of media coverage change the pattern? Second, look at conditions under which the reputation arguments apply. Different situations require different analogies. Is Bosnia the analogy or is Rwanda the analogy. What is the relevant analogy for a given situation? Finally, we need to disaggregate groups. People steeling food aid are not the people that get slaughtered at the end. Often the people who are dying are not the people who are killing.

Question and Answer
Q1: (Bill Becker and Alex Downes) What is the gambling aspect of interventions? It is a probabilistic game, not an insurance game. It is not a house, but your life—the group's survival may be at stake. Is the argument sufficient or do other factors cause the decision but moral hazard shapes the type of strategy or tactics employed. What precedents are cited when groups discuss the possibility of 3rd party intervention?

- Kupperman: The question of where does learning come from is answered by my coauthors. They find that most learning comes from local cases within the country, but also within the region. The more proximate an intervention has been to your own case both geographically and temporally, the more likely it is that you believe the intervention is likely. The Kosovo lesson was drawn from the Bosnia and Croatia intervention. The Bosnia lesson was from Iraq with the Kurds. With regard to the insurance game versus probabilistic game, insurance is probabilistic when you are committing fraud. Other prime examples of moral hazard are also probabilistic, for example, the IMF bailout. Why are rebels optimistic? There have been lots of interventions, just not perfect interventions.

Q2: (Col Cayce?) Afghanistan was the first time they dropped bombs and food simultaneously. They changed their policies once they realized how ridiculous this was. They dropped leaflets prior to bombings and when they dropped food after bomb, they made packets with new colors so people could distinguish food from bombs. Going back to the previous panel, he argues the military has no mechanism to count civilian casualties. The military can tell you if they accidentally shoot five people at a check point, but during most battles the military has no way of accounting for civilian casualties. In addition, the military's mission is to win the war not to do field research. He asks if in our effort to reduce civilian casualties, have we made it worse for civilians by making the conflict longer and raising the body count? The U.S. military may be able to go 15 rounds with our hands tied behind our back but it could be that we could win the first round with both our hands. Would winning in the first round save lives?

- Licsher: The NGO perspective on the bombs and food was that dropping food was a turf issue. They don't want the military to do that. One problem with Iraq was that dropping food couldn't target the neediest and was not adequate.
- Greenhill: She agrees that as we push for a greater and greater reduction in civilian casualties, we may get to a point where the costs are not worth the benefits.

Q3: (Bill Arkin) Fighting the war and saving civilians are synonymous if you comply with the laws of war, which requires that you always try and do better with regard to civilian casualties. If you use anecdotal evidence that there is a cost associated with being more cautious, you need to substantiate it. Looking at Kosovo, the war was longer because the U.S. was more cautious, but it is ridiculous to think that a more aggressive war would have saved lives. Modulating warfare has positive political effects.
- Greenhill: It is not a black and white issue. It is all about tradeoffs. The military cares about casualties but other things are important. It's a fact that our adversaries believe we try and limit civilian casualties. That is why they try and manipulate this aversion. Its also a fact that this causes more civilian casualties. These things can be used by good guys and bad guys.

Q4: (Garfield) Estimates of civilian casualties are not all over the place; a two fold increase isn't huge given the conditions in Iraq. The common political criticism is that you just can't know these things. Advancing this claim is very harmful. Military should not be in business of humanitarian assistance. The major problem for NGOs is a lack of security and this is complicated by the fact that the new way of war is to undermine security, not to defeat the military. Military can do much more for humanitarianism by ensuring security so the NGOS can do what they need to do.

Q5: (Avant) Alan, Is avoiding violence our primary gold standard? The idea that we would avoid conflict ignores the politics that are operating in the background? Or is avoiding civilian casualties the gold standard? This might have other political effects as well. Kelly, your argument assumes that good guys are good and good guys could win, but if they abandon their standards are they still good guys? Sarah, you say that NGOs have abandoned their values but it could be that NGOs have different values that are competing. She applauds all the panelists for looking at the political effects of norms.
- Kupperman: Premise to the question is that there is some injustice to rebellion. In Bosnia there wasn't injustice until they decided to succeed from Yugoslavia. In Kosovo they were abusing their autonomy— they were not faultless. Many people who are pro-intervention have an agenda of promoting liberation at the cost of escalating genocidal violence. Many of them recognize this tradeoff but no one makes this claim. They pretend that all good things go together, but this is not possible. The choice between two policies: revolutionary liberation at the cost of genocidal violence versus evolutionary liberation.
- Lischer: There are as many combinations of values as there are NGOS and there are unspoken values that they subconsciously promote. It is hard to study that systematically.

Q6: (Colin) Perverse effects of protecting civilians can make conflict longer but unleashing the dogs of war can increase indirect effects by a lot by destroying the infrastructure. If the goal is to avoid an insurgency or trying to suppress one, you would not necessarily want to be to aggressive because you would alienate people. In a world were it is good that Milosevic got stopped, maybe the lesson is that we need to enforce this norm earlier.

- Greenhill: You assume a black and white or that the baseline is ignoring the laws of war. I don't think they should abandon the laws of war but continuing to tighten them might tip the balance. I agree that alienation and infrastructure are problematic if you did abandon the laws of war, but sometimes fighting a fierce war can have decisive effects and political benefits.
- Kupperman: We found that in Rwanda, most of the people would have died anyway if we intervened after it had already started but a larger preventive force might have been able to put out fire. Problem is that there were at least 16 large wars going on at the time. We can't do all of them. Milosevic was one of the more moderate people vying for power, so decapitation does not always work. If there is a Hitler, we should take him out, but there are not that many Hitlers. Peacekeepers were already in Bosnia.

Q7: (Claudia ?) I appreciate the difference among NGOS—what are your policy recommendations for dealing with these challenges?

- Lischer: Richard provided one answer, which is to provide security for these NGOS. Absent that, NGOS have to many bad choices to make. They can hire security. They can withdrawal. They can publicize their need for security a little better. Because they are uncomfortable with security, they often do not do this.

Q8: (Frank ?) The context of Bosnia is hard. The military intervention followed Croatia and Slovenia. They believed they had a right to succession. In Bosnia, NGOS had religious and political identities. They are consumers of aid and infrastructure--how do you balance military needs with this demand?

- Kupperman: The lesson in Bosnia was not only the international community had intervened in Croatia and Slovenia but also that the headquarters for that intervention was in Sarejevo.

Panel VII: Casualties and the Media

Cori Dauber:

In the debate over the link between public opinion and casualties has either ignored or dismissed the role of the media. That is a serious omission. She acknowledges that she cannot prove a link between media coverage and public opinion, but she can tease out some of the issues brought up in the media in the Iraq war. Media effects are notoriously difficult to capture but we do need a qualitative study about how the media frames casualties.

The Feaver/Gelpi hypothesis is that optimism matters. They ignore the fact that optimism on the ground does not necessarily translate into public optimism. Some recent surveys have shown that there is a disconnect between public optimism and troop optimism. This is probably due to the fact that the how the situation on the ground is interpreted by the public is determined by the press who chooses the range of facts to be covered and how they are contextualize. At the end of the day all the public knows about the war is what they learn about the war from the press. This of particular interest to us for a number of reasons: first, there are differences recorded in the ability of the press to affect public opinion when news covers issues that are obtrusive versus an non-obtrusive. The media can talk about inflation but we go to the grocery store and can compare media reports with reality. The media can talk about health care, but again we can compare those reports with reality when we right checks to the doctor's office. This is not the case in war. Only a small number of us have outside information.

Second, Iraq is a war against an enemy that uses terrorist tactics. What drives terrorism? What makes it work? Terrorism is a media driven tactic. In most military engagements, if a platoon takes a hill because it is easy to defend or it lets the platoon capture the other army. If that engagement isn't reported in the media, the value of that piece of territory is not decreased. Terrorists select targets based on different criteria. The Red Cross is an important target not because the building has any military value but because terrorists knew that it will be covered. If we do not cover terrorist attacks, this drastically decreases the publicity, and the strategic goal of terrorism is defeated.

The strategic logic behind terrorism is defeated if it is not reported. If they bomb a hotel but it doesn't fall, it is a tactical failure. But if it is reported in the news, especially if it is played again and again, it is a strategic success.

This may explain why the press is often the target of attacks in Iraq. It may not be that Iraq is particularly dangerous but rather that reporters are targeted specifically because it ensures that terrorist actions are covered.

Media savvy enemies give their footage to the networks. They stage attacks, hide and film the attacks and upload it to the internet. This is not footage filmed by an objective photo journalist. It is propaganda. When we see is a humvee being blown up, but what we are watching is American soldiers being blown up.

The question to ask is: what is the narrative frame in which the story is embedded? Reporters do not cover stories. They cover events, and they have to condense these events and all the information into a few paragraphs or a 90 second sound bite. She gives some examples from Afghanistan and Iraq where the facts in the article were very different from the headline and first paragraph framing.

Dauber looked at the reporting of casualties and found that often stories have no narrative frame. That raised the question of what is the narrative frame when there is no narrative frame. Readers read a sentence that chronicles injuries and deaths. But they cannot tell if we won the battle or lost the battle, so the frame is one of never ending, pointless, deaths. There is no information to let readers know if soldiers are dying for any meaningful cause of if they are winning or losing. Readers cannot put casualties in context to make that cost benefit analysis.

There is little evidence that framing influences public opinion. It may set the agenda and set the parameters for the debate but it rarely changes people's minds about

an issue. We need a study that combines the examination of rhetoric and social science type research.

Robert Entman:

Entman notes that a number of scholars have emphasized the importance of leadership in shifting public opinion. Leadership means convincing Americans that the mission is worth fighting and that it will be successful. This literature seems to lack a theory of exactly what leadership does to shape public opinion and what role the media plays in that process. Can leaders show that an intervention is the in the national interest ad that it will be successful? Can they frame public opinion as supportive and frame themselves as a strong leader, thereby lowering the intensity or salience of majority opposition. What drives public perceptions of success and what drives policy maker's perception of public opinion?

Entman develops a cascade model to answer these questions. The administration makes a decision which is communicated to party elites, which is picked up by the media who frame the information and present it to the public. There is almost no demand for information from sources outside the government. This leads journalists to take the path of least resistance and give their audience what they want to hear. The public does not relish being presented with complicated moral problems or realistic continuing reminders of the missions cost. Journalists also have to deal with the restrictions the Administration places on the media.

This means that opposing elites have a hard time generating a new frame but they also have political reasons for not developing that frame when the public does not like hearing about the costs or war. It is unlikely to be picked up by the media and it is unlikely to generate political benefits.

This leads to fragmented individual, daily supports that are not woven into a counter narrative that translates into high intensity opposition. Another important lesson is that the media is not the only one responsible for the appearance or lack of certain stories and how they are framed. The groups that provide information to the media or choose not to provide information to the media are also responsible.

A number of factors influence what frames get chosen: the facts, the skills of news managers in the administration, the skills of the opposition managers, biases of the media process, biases of market demand, and the event's context. Biases of the process are normative and often lead to slanting toward Presidents or ideas that journalists feel are popular or powerful. They also have a negativity bias. Biases of market demand slant coverage toward simplification, dramatization, and going after symbols. Success at controlling the slant is an interaction effects of the skills of the administration and the opposition at constructing coherent messages. Time is probably also a factor, especially in that we may see previous frames disproved as time passes. He gives the example of the WMD frame.

It is possible to study this systematically by comparing whether the white house frame dominates the potential opposition frame. In order to asses this Entman looks at how the media defines the problem, whether it issues a moral judgment, and whether it endorses the remedy proposed by the administration. The White House lost control of the framing of Abu Graib but in Falluja, the White House frame was dominant. In Falluja there were two possible frames. The White House frame was that this is an

important mission to root out insurgents and the opposition frame was that this operation caused hundreds of civilian casualties for reasons that are not justified. The media did not differentiate by combatant and noncombatant Iraqi casualties and they did not mention that many of the commanders on the ground did not support the mission. You can look at framing systematically, we can move beyond anecdotal stuff.

Entman concludes by noting that we need to systematize our study of framing, what the president does to frame things, when it framing is successful, how the media respond, why they respond the way they do.

The paper he based his talk on will be published in the upcoming year. You can see a copy of it here (add link)

Sean Aday

Aday looks at data from the beginning of the war until the statue falls on April 9th. Press coverage of this war is the same as all wars, even Vietnam. There is a lot of battle coverage but not much casualty coverage. The media saw lots of casualties but they chose not to show it on the news. This was primarily self censorship on the part of the editors. The reason for this censorship is multifaceted. Sometimes editors do not allow them to show these images. At times they feel political pressure to not show casualties because of the belief that it would not be patriotic. This has been exacerbated by Fox's willingness to question the patriotism of other networks. This has been a bigger factor because Fox has done very well in the media market. This is especially important in this era of media diversity, not only between networks but also with the emergence of blogs. They also do not want to turn off their viewers.

We do see more coverage of civilian casualties, but not much more. Much of the coverage of civilian casualties is taken from Arab networks airing on U.S. networks, but U.S. networks do not show the full segment. So Al Jazzera would have footage of civilian bodies entering the hospital and they would follow the bodies in and tape until they pulled the sheet back so viewers could actually see the body. The U.S. network would only air the part where the covered bodies enter the hospital.

They do not want to show the public the costs of war but they do want to show the wizbang part of war. Both parts make up the story. Why don't they show the casualties? The reason they choose to only show a segment of the clip is partially due to the fact that the media believe the casualty aversion myth. They do not believe the public can handle these images and they do not want to hurt their audience share. What is the consequence of having a media that is averse to showing casualties?

There is not much evidence of a CNN effect on the public but there may be a CNN effect on policy makers, who anticipate the effect of casualties on the public and then choose their engagements based on a belief that we can win with low casualties.

When do media effects shape attitudes? The effect of the media is more likely to be positive than negative. At the beginning of a war, the media contributes to the rally effect but as the war drags on the media matters less.

The effects of casualty coverage depend on a four things: partisan predispositions, what else is happening in the news, elite cues, and other events.   In experiments that Aday has conducted, he found that partisans reframe the images they see through the prism of their own ideological dispositions. Conservatives were more likely to feel pride, while liberals are more likely to feel anger and disgust when they saw images of battle

images and casualties. Conservatives saw a casualty and thought "noble sacrifice." Liberals saw a casualty and thought "what a waste."

The effects of casualty coverage also depends on elite cues and are a function of consensus and disensus. Its not just that Clinton does not provide leadership after Black Hawk Down, its that he leaves a vacume for other elites to fill, specifically the opposition party. Its not that just that Bush has shown leadership during the Iraq War, its also that do not see an organized opposition, its all over the map.

Events on the ground matter also matter: the stage of conflict, how long it has been going on, the nature of the conflict and the type of policy objective we are pursing, where the conflict is taking place—Afghanistan versus Iraq—, and how much progress the U.S. has made toward achieving its goals.

The media is not an independent variable that can explain war support. Rather it is an intervening variable. Media is not very effective at creating attitudes or changing attitudes but it can be effective at reinforcing attitudes and norms, such patriotism and rally around the troops. When elites are in consensus at the beginning of the war, you get one-sided coverage that tends to lead to battle images and often patriotic news coverage. That leads to pride and enthusiasm, which leads to less critical thinking and that leads to a positive effect on public opinion. Two sided effects have the opposite effect.

The framing window for elites is at the beginning because this is when the public is most willing to override their own dispositions and when the media are most acceptant. But this is precisely the time when the opposition is most hesitant to criticize the administration. The framing window closes midstream and it is much harder for the opposition to shape public attitudes at this point.

We should not worry about news coverage of casualties. They should not be. Public opinions are framed early by elite consensus or polarization, elite framing, and events. It is very hard for the opposition to turn public against a neccesary, well run war but it is equally hard for the administration to convince the public that a poorly run, low interest war is in worth supporting even if the casualties are low.

I its important to not think of media coverage of war in isolation. Support for the president more generally, the president's handling of the war, and the war itself are closely related to how the president is handling other policies. One of the reasons you see a drop in presidential support in 2005 and even in war support is because of his domestic agenda, beginning with Social Security.

What if intervening in a humanitarian mission is the right thing to do or what if staying involved in a civil war is the right thing to do? We need to figure out a way to get the public to support interventions they aren't likely to support but which must be undertaken or maintained. Leaders need to reframe the issue in more favorable terms. They need to get a true international coalition to support our cause and they need to win relatively quickly in a well executed war. The fortitude of our leadership is a key factor, but even strong leadership isn't enough if the other factors are not present. If staying in Iraq is the right thing to do media framing does not matter. What matters is whether we win.

Brendan Nynan (discussant)

The media is both a dependent variable and an independent variable. In order to understand the media we need to look at what influences what the media reports and also what the effects of media coverage are.

For the media as a dependent variable, we have an empirical dilemma about what causes media coverage both at the micro level—how is Falluja covered—and the macro level—what is the tone of war coverage more generally. What are the inputs of elites? It is also important to look at the role of professional norms within the media. Specifically, how does the norm of objectivity influence the way they report about casualties.

This is a normative dilemma. What the media should be doing is not something that we agree on. Should they be objective when two sides make different factual claims or should they try and seek out the truth? Should they interpret facts or just give them to the public?

If you look at media as the independent variable, we have a dilemma again. From the normative side, we want some framing to work but not all framing. We are troubled by experimental data that shows that people change their opinion fairly easy but at times we want it to work. Where we draw the line depends on our own beliefs. There is also a larger question of whether public opinion should matter when there is a policy question. We do not want public opinion to matter at the beginning of the war if it would cause us to pull out prematurely but from the perspective of a democratic society, public opinion should matter when we are deciding what to do about the war. But unfortunately, this is when framing does not matter.

There is also a difference between the micro and the macro level. When does media coverage affect people's opinions? It may be that reading one story does not influence their opinions but that at the aggregate level, new coverage does change public percepts of a war. Although people do not change their mind in the short term after reading a particular story, they may change their mind in the mid-term. Casualties may be a variable that need to be included to judge aggregate effects. Do different stories actually change our perceptions or do we interpret them the way we want to?

- Entman: The actual impacts of casualties on public opinion are one important variable. The way that elites perceive public opinion is also important. In addition, public opinion is not necessarily consistent. The torture of 12 people is very important but hundreds of civilian casualties is not very important. Entman argues that this is because the frame surrounding the stories of civilian casualties do not resonate but the frame around Abu Graib did. The process that results in death is important as well as the actual number of casualties
- Dauber: The norm is not to refrain from referring from casualties. The norm is not to show bodies. Its about the visualization of death. It's the same norm that exists about showing bodies more generally. The media does not show bodies in car accidents or homicides. These norms extend to non combat situations.
- Aday: Not sure if it's a good norm to group them all together. Driving doesn't necessarily involves killing, but war does. Public needs to make this cost benefit analysis and it may not be possible if they are not seeing the human cost.

Q1: (Mike) Casualties are the context, casualties are explaining the cost of war. Media coverage is so sanitized do people even realize what they are seeing?
- Dauber: We are watching Americans being killed but they don't realize that it is an American soldier dying. People take pictures with intention and we use picture taken by our enemies who took those pictures for propaganda purposes.
- Aday: It is an empirical question. Elites are afraid that we'll see propaganda and believe it. Why Condelesa Rice is telling networks to stop airing Osama Bin Laden? If I am told that this is terrorist footage why is it assumed that I will buy their propaganda and not respond with disgust and revulsion? We don't think—Osama bin Laden makes a good point—we think, what a bastard.
- Dauber: But there is a normative question. If it is terrorist propaganda the networks should not present it as news footage and if they do use it, they need to cue it properly.

Q3: (Chris for Sean) Media frames contribute to the rally effect but are less successful at reducing support later in the world. Wouldn't we exect media frames to be an accelerant in both scenarios? After something like Tet where people are already worying, the media can accelerate opposition.
- Aday: My argument is about timing. We know that people are most vulnerable to framing when they do not know anything, which is at the beginning of the war. The media is likely to show casualty coverage and other negative aspects of the war when there the elites disagree. But at that stage of the game, the public's opinion has already hardened.

Q4: (Peter) What is the measure of elite consensus and why do you conclude that there is no elite disensus now? How does the model account for the failure of the administration to frame Sheehan's claim that the administration has no plan for Iraq? That myth began in the 2004 campaign but it gets revived in May of 2005 and has continued to this day.
- Aday: There is disensus now but the opposition is disorganized now. There is no focus on one argument. Democrats are all over the board. To the extent that they have an argument, they focus on Bush's incompetence in post war planning. But that is an anti-Bush argument it is not a policy argument.
- Peter: This might be why we see movement in Bush approval but not as much movement in support for withdrawing or for changing the course of the war. You see this counter narrative driving down opinion in specific domains that are linked to that narrative.
- For an actual measure you could look to see how often congressional leaders are cited on the front page of the leading newspapers criticizing the President. I think if you did this you would see a difference between Republicans in Somalia and Democrats in Iraq with the exception of 2005-election year
- Personalization bias may explain why Sheehan got leverage. Also popularity bias—if the media believes a president's popularity is falling they are more likely to look for opposition frames if they exist. In addition, in this war the reason the opposition frame may have mattered later in the war is because the

original frame of WMD was proved wrong and that created space later in the war which may not have been there had we found WMD. But now if we look at the beginning of the counterinsurgency and the frame that Bush had no plan, even if he does have plan now it will be hard for him to convince the public otherwise because their beliefs on this issue have already hardened.

Q4. (Frank?) Real issue is a loss of credibility. Casualties as a topic, does not hit home. What is the replacement for influencing opinion if the media is becoming less influential?
- Dauber: Casualties do continue to resonate but this conversation is a little removed from reality. In Somalia, the press represented those images as if there was only one way to interpret them. The media's credibility has been lowered but claims of the death of the media are overstated. The Iraq war today is fought in a media environment that is very different. During the Persian Gulf, there was only CNN. There is so much competition now.
- Aday: We are headed toward less foreign news coverage, compare Afghanistan and Iraq. Where you have bureaus really effects what type of news you get.

Q5. (Patrick) In the information war, there are two consumers: the American public and the Arab/Islamic world. Media effects may play out differently depending on each audience. Can you speak to how well these models travel as the U.S. tries to influence public opinion abroad?
- Entman: Agree with that our messages affect other publics and that in turn affects our ability to select specific policies. I'm starting a book that uses the cascade model to look at how the president can influence foreign public opinion. These two processes are related and interact. We need to develop these models.

Q6. (Chris ?) Terrorists require media to get their information out. They want to conquer minds not hills and valleys. Media coverage of terrorism could help them recruit or make others fearful of them but it could also lead to repulsion and disgust and hurt their cause. If they need the media, why target the media? Do they want to have a monopoly on news coverage? Why don't we fight their propaganda with our own propaganda.
- Dauber: Terrorists have bad audience analysis- terrorism audience cuts the other way. Take 9/11 as an example. The reaction of the American public was very different from what terrorists expected. It wasn't fear. It was anger. The media doesn't show twin towers. The reason they target the media is because Iraq is the main story when a journalist has been kidnapped, or bombed, ect.